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Rea Texas State Legislative Redistricting Case--Graves v. Barnes 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE 
This application for a stay pending appeal is from the judg-
ment of a three-judge court sitting in the USDC WD Texas (GOldberg, 
Justice, Woods--Per Curiam). The action below grows out of four 
consolidated actions filed in four district courts. The four 
cases raised the following issuesa 
(1) Graves--challenge to apportionment plan for the Senatorial 
Districts in Harris County (Houston) on the ground that they 
were racially gerrymandered. 
(2) Regester--challenge to the House of Representative re-
apportionment plan for the Texas House on the ground of popula-
tional disparities. They also challenged the use of multi-member 
districts in the metropolitan communities as invidious discrimi-
nation. 
(3) Marriott--challenged the House reapportionment plan's 
provisions dealing with multi-member districts (Dallas plaintiffs) __,.. 
(4) Archer--challenge to the House Plan on the ground that 
multi-member districts violate equal protection (San Antonio--
Bexar County). Also challenged the Senate Plan on ground of 
racial gerrymandering. 
The four cases were consolidated and a single three-judge 
panel appointed by Judge Brown. A pretrial conference was held on 
12/22/71 and an expedited discovery and trial procedure was agreed 
on. The Plans under attack--both House and Senate--were promul-
gated by the ~exas Legislative Redistricting Bd, a bod~reated by 
the Texas Constitution to resolve all redistricting problems if 
the Texas Legislature is unable to redistrict in its , first session 
after the decennial census. The Plans were handed down on the 
15th and 22d of October. 
II. 
--2 .. -
HOLDINGS OF THE THREE~Judge 
(1) The Senate R~tricting 
---... A 
COURT 
Plan promulgated by the Board was -approved by the court and is not now before you in this stay 
application. 
(2) The House Redistricting Plan was held violative of the -equal protection clause because of populational deviations. The 
court found, using the most conservative statistical measuring 
rod offered by the State, that there existed populational deviation 
of 9.9 .%. The comrt noted that the burden is on the State to 
justify deviations from t methematical equality, i.e., that it was 
the State's burden to demonstrate a rational justification for 
populational disparities. The court held that the State had 
offered no evidence to meet that burden. The only justification 
offered was adherence to county lines. The court noted, on that 
score, that (1) the plan itself crossed county lines in 19 in~ 
stances, and (2) decisions of the Supreme Court have held that 
blind adherence to political lines will not justify such wide 
disparities. Despite its concluion that the House Plan was uncon-
.s-fared 
stitutional, the three-judge court that it was unwilling 
to ursurp the prerogative of the Texas House of Representatives 
until it becomes clear that the State is unwilling to correct it 0 s 
deficiencies. Therefore, the court stayed its own decision for 
purposes of the upcoming election. The Board 9 s deficient plan will 
go into operation for this election. But, between the convening 
of the 1973 Session and July 1 of that year the Texas house is ~nkr 
ordens to write another plan. If the State House refuses to act
1 
then the DC, which is retaining jurisidiction, will 
then enter a plan of its own. At this point in time, then, there 
is no air of immediacy about that aspect of the case. This Court 
will have ample opportunity to pass on the merits of this segment of 
--3 ... 
case before any irreparable injury may occur. The State virtually 
concedes that the stay is not being sought to abate the court's 
decision on this aspect of the case (P. 19 of Stay appli-
cation). 
(3) The court held the 18-man multi-member disftrict in 
Dallas County ........ unconstitutional. The court ordered 
the imp~mentation of single-member dis~tricts for Dallas 
according to its own plan. The court's plan will be in effect 
for this upcoming election,but the State's Redistricting Plan which 
the court orden.fby July 1, 1973 may impose different requirements. 
As an "equity of transition" the court ruled that the candidate 
need not reside in the district from which he runs in this 
next election. The provision of the Texas Constitution re-
quiring residence in the district is abated for this year--the 
candidate may live IfilL anywhere in the county. 
(4) The court held that the 11-man multi-member district 
in San Antonio (Bexar County) violated the constitution • • The ct 
here also imposed its own plan for the 1972 elections and abated the 
residency rule. 
(5) The court refused to hold that the other 9 multi-member 
districted metropolitan communities in the State violated the 
Constitution. That aspect of the case is not before you in 
this application. 
III. DISCUSSION 
As CEP and I read this application, the only two issues 
before you on this request for stay are whether the Dallas and 
Bexar County multi-member districts are Constitutionally unaccept-
able. The law on this question seems clear (although its impli-
mentation presents difficult factual problems). 
-'I-
Multi-member districts are not per se unconstitutional. In 
Whitcomb v. Chavis the Court makes clear that the 14th Amendment 
does not imply that "any group with distinctive interests must be 
represented in the legislative halls if it is numerous enough 
to command at least one seat." No group, as the three-judge 
notes, ~s any constitutional right to be successful in its po-
rlte 
litical activities." However, ~ State "may not design a SJ!Stem 
" that deprives such groups of a reasonable chance to be successful. 
(P. 56 of DC opinion). On several occasions this Court has 
made clear that 
apportionment schemes including multi-member districts 
will constitute invidious discrimination only if it can be -shown that 'desi&nedly or otherwise, a multi-member consti-
tuency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a 
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out 
the voting strength of racial or political elements of 
the voting population." 
Burns v. Richardson, 384 u.s. 73, 88 (1966). See also Fortson v. 
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,438-39 (1965); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. ~ 
124, 143 (1971). Finally, Whitcomb made clear that the ~n ~ 
rests on the challenger to demonstrate that the multi-member dis-~~ 
trict unconstitutionally operates to dilute or cancel the voting 
strength of racial or political elements. Id. at 144. It is un-
contested that the DC was fully aware of the applicable law. 
Indeed, as to both Dallas and Bexar Counties, the DC did conclude 
that multi-member districts tended to dilute or cancel out the 
vote of Negro or Mexican-American elements. (Pp. 42, SS-56). 
The controlling inquiry is whether the facts found by the DC 
supported that judgment. 
(1) Dallas County 
To place the question in context, the DC noted that the multi-
member district plan cannot be justified as State dedication to 
-S· 
the neutral principle that such districts are to be preferred in 
' . . 
all metropolitan communities, Houston, the largest community, \~ ...._ ,_.,, .... ~ .. 
does not have multi-member districts but has 23 single-member ~
districts (Harris County). As the DC noted, the disparity be- ~ 
I~ 
tween Houston and all other metropolitan areas--a disparity which 
the State made no effort to explain--leads to the inference 
that the plan is either arbitrary for no reason or is affirm-
atively discriminatory for some impermissible mot~ve. Secondly, 
as a preface applicable to both counties in question in this case, 
the DC indicated that it is more expensive to run from a large 
multi-member district than it is to run in a geographically smaller 
----------------------community for a single district slot. This cost increase ---...... -
makes it more difficult for poorer classes to be represented. 
This is an impact of multi-member districts which adheres in all 
such districts but is one upon which this Court does not appear to 
()7'1... 
have focuse~in any of its major reapportionment cases. 
Turning to the factors which the DC found controlling in 
Dallas, the following aspects of the Dallas Plan were relied 
upona ~ ~~ ~~ "! 
(1) Most o~las's 16% Black population votes Democratic. 
The Party slate is drawn up by the Dallas Committee for Responsi-........, ' 
ble~Gyvernment and Negroes have no voice on that Committee. The 
they are 
Committee tells the Blacks how many slots ii i4 allowed on the ballot. 
In the 20th Century only 4 Negroes have been placed on the ballot. 
(2) The Dallas County delegation to the State House of Re-
presentatives has consistently failed to represent their Black 
constituents, Dalles Legislators led the fight for segregation in 
the 1950s. As recently as 1970, the DCRG was utilizing racial 
campaign tactics to win races in white precincts. 
(3) Hostility toward Blacks has been in the past, and is today, 
-~ -
"an integral part of Dallas County poli~ics." This is to be 
distinguished from Marion County (Indianapolis) in the Whitcomb 
case in which the Court found~ race played no significant role 
in party politics. 
(4) Within the multi-member district Texas uses a mechan-
ism known as the "place requirement." Under this rule each -candidate must choose a place on the ballot. It makes no difference 
which area of the county is his homeaindeed, as the court statede 
all the candidates could conceivably live in the same apartment 
house. Because of this rule it is quite possible--and the usual 
occurrence--that none of the Party's candidates is from the ________________________________ ,_____________  
Black segment of town. -- .., 
(5) Another aspect of the multi-member district plan is the 
"majority" requirement. Under this requirement, which the DC 
pointed out was a tool utilized only in Southern States, each -
successful candidate must garner a majority of the vote. Under 
--------~---------------------------------------------------the Texas scheme, therefore, the eighteen candidates receiving 
the most votes are not necessarily the representatives. Each 
must poll a majority of the vote. Run-off elections will be held 
for all places in which a majority was. not obtained. The DC 
-I-ke pl~e reuire..,errr dvJ. ik majori~ r't!ffire rtterrf-j 
found that these two requirements,~working together operate to 
"submerge racial or political minorities." 
(2) Bexar County (San Antonio) 
The p~em in San Antonio is somewhat different from the 
Dallas case. Here the recognizable element of the electorate is 
the Mexican~American population and, although no statistics are 
cited, they clearly represent a significant percentage of the 
a.. nalyo~ 
population (around 50%). The DC launches its 1L a · ~with 
an extended discussion indicating that Mexican: American 8 s do 
....... 
constitute a recognizable ethnic group ~ntit led to the same . \,.; 
equal protection guarantees available to Negroes. It then 
indicates that these Mexican-Americans or "Chicanos" live 
predomintly in the "barrio" or West Side of San Antonio within a 
small and relatively contiguous area. The court points out the 
"appalling" conditions of poverty under which they live and 
v i.s/lole 
that they exist in a defimable and e· 2 r•e subculture with 
own 
its severe cultural and language barriers, epaJ.al-tn(J Me haJ.-r JO 
A fre~h} r~t!.. r~n?u/nder A .r~ #n,t!t:7.Hi'o, 
(!) ; ·Looking again at the difficulties of campaigning costs, the 
DC found that Anglo candidates spend 2 o~ 3 times as much as 
Chicano candidates. 
(2) Only 4 candidates have run from the barrio since 1880 for 
the Texas House of Representatives. Only 5 Chicanos from Bexar 
County have served in the Texas Legislature since 1880. 
(3) Voter registration is very low in San Antonio among Mexican-
Americans. Only about 30% of all of that group register. The 
DC finds that the multi-member district pattern operates to keep 
the Mexicans from realizing their participatory role in the 
government. 
(4) Of course, Bexar County has the same majority-place requirements 
which operate in Dallas. 
CONCLUSION 
First, despite the other disagreements among the panel mambers, 
and despite Judge Woods' disagreement with the philosophy of 
federal judicial activity in the reapportionment area, all three 
concur in the finding that Bexar and Dallas Counties may not 
retain multi-member districts. They reach this conclusion precisely l 
fltGre.- pcJJ..fic.vl a J- c.l tsff.~e.f.s \ 
because they agree tha~ 't:!ilay "operate to dilute or cancel the \ 
\ 
voting strength of racial or political elements." 
---8--
Second, the DC's order is drawn narrowly(as the Court in 
~£itcomb_ intimates that it should b~. 403 U.S. at 160-61. The 
DC looked at the individual districts and found that these two 
met the standards of proof called for by Whitcomb. It did not 
strike down multi-member districts in 9 other metropolitan areas 
~~--------------------------of Texas. This restrictiveness in the court's decision is the 
best indicator that the court did not really conclude that 
multi-member districts are presumptively invalid. 
Third, the State urges that it will be difficult, expensive, 
and maybe even impossible for the two counties in question to re-
do their voter registration statistics before the upcoming pri-
maries. The State is apparently concerned about telling citizens 
in which precinct they are to vote. However, the State nowhere 
tells us in how many cases the court's lines cross precinct lines. 
h ~t lfG tUnUIII tJ 
There are 299 precincts in Dallas, which ~ been divided~ 18 
, h~t V<!. 
districts. There are about 225 precincts in San Antonio, wh~ch ._. 
4Aflrn!J 
been divided~ 11 districts. Without other information 1 it is 
my guess that relatively few of the precincts will be severed by 
the district lines. Most will probably be entirely within a 
single district. Indeed, I am not persuaded that the counties will 
necessarily need to alter precinct lines for this election. Resi-
dents in precincts which straddle district lines could still vote 
at the same polling place but would be instrlcted to vote for 
different candidates. I assume all this information could be . 
dtssiminated through the newspapers or through one mass mailing 
to all registered voters. 
I would deny the stay. The question is a narrow one--whether 
the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the multi-member 
districts in two counties operated to dilute or cancel the voting 
strength of racial or political elements. The DC, as I read its 
_,_ 
opinion 9 correctly appraised the status .of Supreme Court law. 
I find the elements of proof relied on by the DC to be sufficient. 
I wonder what the plaintiffs could have done to make a stronger r~~~~ 
Dallas is notoriously well-known for its 
·r o a. c. c. e~ t- ra.c::.1 a./ 
case. 1 reluctanc~ 
over the last 20 years. The history of San Antonio is, in some 
respects, more disappointing. The "minority" there is larger 
yet its needs have been largely ignored for many, too,nmany1 years. 
Neither the Blacks nor the Chicanos have ever actively participated 
in Texas political life. Multi-member district abolition is 
fht"s 
certainly not the universal salve that will end ~ long history 
''- ,.,., 
,.,~J,IVH;Jo }?4 
of political impotence. That ~sng sm--coupled with the majority-
place requirement, and ruit by a powerful ~emocratic machine--
has contributed to subjugation. On the other side of the scale, 
Cll 
where we would suspect to find a catelogue of unique state interests 
justifying the continued utilization of multi-member districts, 
there is nothing. The State has chosen to offer no explanation. 
In light of the status of Houston it is not surprising that the 
State has failed to lay before the court its reasons for 
multi-member districts. 
For mep the question is not a difficult one. I recommend that 
you reject the application for stay pending appeal. 
LAH 
~ - 7 --z.- J 4-7 -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNlTED STATES 
Xo. ~\-793 
Curtis Graves et al. 
v. 
Ben Barnes et al. 
Diana Regester et al. 
v. 
Bob Bullock ot al. 
Johnny :\Iariott et al. 
v. 
Preston Smith et al. 
Van Henry Archer, Jr .. 
v. 
Pre ton Smith et al. 
Application for a Stay of a Judg-
ment of a Three-Judge Dis-
trict Court for the \V estern 
District of Texas. 
[F0bruary 7, 19721 
:VIH. JrSTICE PowELL. Circuit Justice. 
This is an application for a i"tay of the judgment of a 
thrce-j uclge court sitting in tho Western District of Texas. 
The court's decision covers issues raised in four consoli-· 
elated actions. Tho principal issues were as follows: 
1. In Graves Y. Barnes, plaintiffs challenged tho State's 
reapportionment plan for the senatorial districts in Harris 
County (Houston) on the ground that they were racially 
gerryma nclerPcl. 
2. In Regester Y. Bullock, the State's reapportionment 
plan for the Texas House of Hepresentativcs "·as chal-
lenged 011 the grounds of population deviatio11S from 
the one-man, one-vote requirement, aml on the imper-
missibility of use of multi-member districts in the nwtro-· 
politan communities. 
-
2 cm.\YES v. B.\TIXES 
3. In Mariott v. Smith, the House plan provision call-
ing for a multi-member district for Dallas County was 
challenged. 
4. 1n Archer Y. Smith, a generally similar attack was 
lcvelkcl against the usc of multi-member clistricting in 
Bexar County (San Antonio). 
The four rases \\We consolidated and tried by a single 
thrC'e-judgc panel. After full pretrial discovery, during 
whirh. over 2,000 pages of depositions "·ere taken, the 
District Court heard testimony at a three-and-one-half 
clay hearing. The extensive per curiam opinon, and the 
concurring and dissenting opinions, "·hich were handed 
dom1 after some three weeks of deliberation, reflect a 
careful and exhaustive consideration of the issues in light 
of the facts as developed. The court's conclusions, in 
substance, \rcrc as follmrs: 
(a) The Senate redistricting plan, as promulgated by 
the Texas Legislative Redistricting Board. was approved. 
(b) The House redistricting plan was held violative 
of the Equal Protection Clause because of population de-
viations from equality of representation. But, in an 
exercise of judicial restraint, the court suspended its 
decision in this respect for the purpose of affording thc 
Legislature of Texas a11 opportunity to adopt a new and 
constitutional plan. Meanwhile, the forthcoming elec-
tion may be held under the plan found to be deficient. 
(c) The multi-nH'mber district plans for Dallas and 
Bexar Counties were found to be unconstitutional under 
the standard prescribed by this Court in Fortson v. Dor-
sey, 379 r. S. 433, 438-39 (1965); Rurns Y. Richardson, 
384 U. S. 73, 88 (1966); and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124, 143 (1971). The three-judge court found from 
the evidence that these multi-member district plans \rould 
operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of 
racitll minority elements of the voting population, and 
ordered the implementation of a plan calling for single-
m.ember districts for Dallas and Bexar Counties. The· 
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counties, and the court was compelled to draft its own 
plan. To minimize tho disruptive impact of its ruling. 
tho court ordered that the State's requirement that can-
didates run from the district of their residence be abated 
for the forthcoming election. A candidate residing any-
where within tho county, therefore, may run for election 
from any district in the county. 
(d) The evidence with respect to nino other metro-
politan multi-member districts was found insufficient to 
warrant treatment sin1ilar to that required for Dallas and 
Bexar Counties. 
(c) Finally, the court's order stated that its judgment 
"·as final and that no stays would be granted. 
In view of the foregoing holdings, the only present 
necessity to consider a stay relates to the District Court's. 
decision with respect to multi-member districts in Dallas 
and Bexar Counties. A number of principles have been 
recognized to govern a Circuit Justice's in-chambers re-
view of stay applications. Stays pending ap11eal to this 
Court are granted only in extraordinary circumstances. 
A lower court judgment, entered by a tribunal that was 
closer to the facts than the single Justice, is entitled to a 
presumption of validity. Any party seeking a stay of 
that judgment bears the burden of showing that tho de-
cision below was erroneous and that the implementation 
of the judgment pending appeal "·ill lead to irreparable 
harm. 
As a threshold consideration, Justices of this Court 
have consistently required there be a reasonable prob-
ability that four Members of tho Court will consider the 
issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note 
probable jurisdiction. See Mahon v. Howell, 404 U. S. 
1201, 1202 (1971); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 
80S. Ct. 33, 4 L. eel. 2d 34 (1959). Of equal importance 
in cases presented on direct appeal-where we lack the 
discretionary power to refuse to decide tho merits-is the 
related question whether five Justices are likely to con-
clude that the case was erroneously decided below. Jus-
' . 
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tices have also 'wiglwcl heavily the fact that the lo,Yer· 
court refused to stay its order pending appeal. indicating 
that it was not sufficiently persuaded of the existence of 
potentially irreparable harm as a result of enforcement 
of its judgment in the interim. 
In applying these considerations to the present case .. 
I conclude that a stay should not be granted. The case· 
received careful attention by the three-judge court, the 
members of which were "on the sce11e" and more familiar 
with the situation than the Justices of this Court; and 
the opinions attest to a conscientious application of 
principles enunciated by this Court. Moreover, the order· 
of the court was narrowly dram1 to effectuate its decision 
with a minimum of interference with the State's legisla-
tive processes, and with a minimum of administrative· 
confusion in the short run. 
Following a practice utilized by other Justices in pass-
ing on applications raising serious constitutional ques-
tions (see Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10, 9 L. ed. 2d 43· 
(1962); M cGee v. Eyman , 83 S. Ct. 230, 9 L. eel. 2d 267 
(1963)), I have consulted informally with each of my 
Brethren "·ho was availablelf at this time during the re-
cess. Although no other Justice has participated in the · 
drafting of this opinion, I am authorized to say that each 
of them would vote to deny this application . My denial 
of a stay at this point, of course, may not be taken 
either as a statement of my own position on the merits 
of the difficult questions raised in this case, or as an indi-
cation of what may, in fact, ultimately be the view of my 
Colleagues on the Court. 
The application is denied. 
·::·All Justices, save two who were not antilable, luwc been consulted . 
This is an appeal by the State of Texas from the judg~ 
ment of a three~judge ct declaring Texas' reapportionment 
scheme for the S~ate House of Representatives unconsti· 
tutional. You are familiar with the facts of this case. 
You denied a stay sought by the State last winter. (Attached 
you will find the lengthy memo I wrote· at that time and a 
copy of your In Chambers opinion). 
The appeal presents three merits issues and one juris~ 
dictional issue. In view of my more extensive treatment in 
the attached memo, I will treat the merits claims in 
conclusory fashion. 
(1) Populational disparity 
The three~judge ct found that the state had failed to 
*~i% a~;:;;:_;t~ ~ ~v~l.£:~ 
I"}--& .. C1-',... ~-
II 
I~ I 
exact populational equality. Rather than enjoin the 
effectiveness of the State's Plan, however , the ct stayed 
the effectiveness of its decision until the summer of 1973. 
Therefore, the elections this fall will go forward under the \ 
state 0 s plan and the State will have an opportuni~ to 
correct it 8 s plan later . 
The State in its jurisdictional statement heavily 
emphasizes this aspect of the case--indeed it is the major 
focus of his claim for this Ct's intervention. ~~ argues that 
the 9.9% disparity was an effort to assure respect for the 
integrity of count~ lines. With the exception of metro---
politan areas, the State asserts that the drafters of the 
Plan only crossed QUQ county line. Appellees assert that 
the Plan crossed 19 county lines and that is the number 
adopted by the DC. The State at bottom argues that the 
course of SC law in this area should change. It seeks a 
ruling that 10 to 20% (or more) disparity should be 
presumptively valid where state reapportionment is con-
cerned. That is one of the claims before the Ct now in the -Virginia state reapportionment case. The Ct may decide 
there whether it is prepared to adopt a double standard for 
the states and whether it is willing to se t some figure 
as the presumptively rational minimum of departure from 
equality. The instant appeal should , therefore , be held 
pending resolution of that question. 
-- ~----------------------------(2) Multi member districts in San Antonio 
Surprisingly, although the State AG preserves this 
issue , he only devotes a page of his brief to it. He still -
argues that multi-member districts should be upheld but he 
,..-3-~ 
does so without the zeal we saw last winter 9 It is my 
guess that your in Chambers opinion took the wind out of 
that argument. It is pretty clear that the three~judge ct 
appropriately applied existing precedent (Whitcomb, Burns, 
Fortson) and that its factual determinations of intentional 
subjugation of racially identifiable minorities is support" 
able. Your conferences with other Justices while the sttay 
was under submission last year would seem to guarantee that 
the Ct will not find this matter noteworthy. 
(3) Multi-member districts in Dallas 
See id. The factual support for the Dallas findings are 
even more persausive than the San Antonio determination. 
(4) Jurisdictional question 
Appellees argue that this Ct does not have jurisdiction. 
Section 1253, which governs appeals directly to this Ct 
from three- judge cts, states tha·t a direct appeal is proper 
from any judgment granting or denying injunctive relief. 
) 
As to the issue of statewide populational disparity the 
lower ct did not grant or deny injunctive relief. Appellees 
therefore assert that the only recourse is appeal to the 
CAS. Or, if the Ct were to view the decision to stay the 
effectiveness of the d#~tiH!d~ judgment as a denial of an 
injunction, the State should not be allowed to appeal on 
that basis because it is not injured by the denial of the 
injunction. To the contrary, it was benefited by the denial 
of the injunction. 
As to the multi-member district issue, appellees 
believe that no direct appeal is available because the 
iHi#I.i# did not issue an order striking down a law of "statewide" 
applicability. Here the appellees are arguing that the DC did 
not have jurisdiction to issue such a narrow order and, 
therefore, this Ct does not have jurisdiction to review. 
My inclination is, as it was last February, that neither 
argument is well taken. The latter fails for two reasons. 
(1) This Ct has encouraged reapportionment cts to issue 
narrow orders, granting injunctive relief only in egregious 
cases where time is not available for the state to correct 
its own system. That is precisely what this DC did. I 
cannot believe that this Ct will now hold that the DC, while 
it had power to consider the whole state, was without power 
to strike down only a narrow portion of the plan. I thina 
, ~ th~ "~ide applicability~ r~le r : fers t~~:_law or regul• 
~ \ at~on under attack at the outset and has nothing to do with 
the scope of the remedy issued by the DC in the exercise of 
its broad equitable powers. (2) Appellees canQt seriously 
be arguing that the DC did not have jurisdiction. If so, 
what prewents the State from asserting in this Ct that the 
DC judgment should be reversed for lack of jurisdiction? 
The argument isp in my view, hypertechnical and unpersaasive. 
And, if the Ct has jurisdiction to review the multi-
member district claims it may, as a pendent matter, review 
the populational disparity issue. Even if the Ct wishes only 
to review the population issue, I think that the failuve of 
the DC to enter or deny an injunction could be disregarded. 
Of coursep if the Ct decides for some reason to note the 
case it should postpone jurisdictional considerations until 
hearing on the merits but I find them not too bothersome. 
HOLD FOR VRIGINIA REAPPORTIONMENT CASE LAH 
· No. 72-147 BUl..l..OCK v. REGESTER Argued 2/24/73 
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LAH 3/1/73 
Re: REAPPORTIONMENT CASES 
Judge: 
The following is an effort to outline in skeletal 
form the issues and critical facts in these three cases 
in order to suggest a manner of disposition which I believe 
is compatible with your vilews as I understand them. 
(1) Bullock v. Weiser, No. 71-1623 
This is the Texas Congressional reapportionment case. 
Populational disparity from the "ideal" of 4.1%. There 
are at least three alternatives that might be selected 
upon which the reverse the DC 9 s determination that the Texas 
plan is unconstidtutional. 
(1) Overrule Kirkpatrick v. Priesler. 
Chalrles Black makes a strong argument for this proposi" 
tion. His primary points are (1) that the historical foundaft 
tion of Article I 9 § 2 shows a desire to achieve approximate 
equality (as suggested in Wesberry v. Sanders) but no serious 
effort to achieve any mathematical parity; (2) populational 
statistics, based on census figures, are too loosely related 
to voter statistics and, therefore 9 provide no accurate 
measure of the existence of disproportiona~lity; (3) the 
rule is productive of "great harm" because it occasions 
considerable judicial intervention in state legislative 
activities. 
Considerations on the other side 9 however 9 suggest 
that an alternative to overruling Kirkpatrick should be 
sought. (1) It is a recent precedent and its abrogation 
would surely be viewed as a consequence of a changed 
...... z- ... 
personnel on the Court. (2) In light of the fact that it 
is cited extensively in Mahin v. Howell (9 times by my 
count) and careful#ly distinguished it would appear 
unseemly to overrule it three months later. This is» 
I think, the reason for Charlie Black's reticence at 
oral argument. I can think of no care which the Court has 
overruled several months after seemingly reaffirming 
its basic principles. (3) Whatever its intellectual 
merit, Kirkpatrick has caused what I regard as happy 
results in state and federal reapportionment. As the table 
indicates, 
in the appellees' brief in Gaffney (p. 26~27)J in the post-
Kirkpatrick era relatively few states have approved 
reapportionment schemes for their senates and houses 
with disparities in excess of 15%. (4) Overruling would 
occasion the reopening of an area of this Court's juris-
prudence that is now on the virge of becoming solidified 
and, within limits, finalized. (5) From a purely personal 
point of view you might be especially reluctant to overrule 
a case of the stature and notoriety of Kirkpatrick in the 
\ 
same Term in which you would overrule other major recent 
cases (I am thinking specifically of Kaufman and Swann~. 
(2) Esta~lish a de minimis rule 
Without overruling Kirkpatrick entirely, the Court 
might depart only from the language in that case which 
declines to adopt any black-and-white percentage rule. 
There is something to be said for the stability and final-
ity that would result from any such rule. It would 
assist in getting the federal courts out of the reapportion-
ment game. But, there are several important considerations 
.... 3 ...... 
on the other side. (1) It would require a partial 
abrogation of Kirkpatrick. (2) There is no strong 
constitutional principle upon which any such per se 
rule can rest. As you have often said, the Constitution 
does not accommodate itself to per se rules. It rests 
instead on broad principles and sensible application on a 
case-by-case basis. (3) In the absence of any solid 
foundational principle, the Court would be open to a charge 
of legislating. How to we pick 4.1% rather than 5.9%? 
The problem would be like that presently faced in the 
Dunn v. Blumstein cases. 
{3) Distinguish Kirkpatrick. 
While this case has been much cited for its rule of 
exact equalityp a creful opinion may be written which 
focuses on the facts of the case and upon the several 
statements of controlling principle in Kirkpatrick. Charlie 
Black does this well (pp 65-79). In essence, an opinion 
would carefully parse the factual background of Missouri 
reapportionment and compare it with a close look at Texas 
congressional reapportionment. Centrally, it would show 
that whil~issouri's legislature affirmatively endeavored 
to subvert the goal· of populational equality in an effort 
to preserve particular seats, i.e., Missouri was not entitled 
to the usual presumption of good faith. Secondly, the opinion 
would emphasize that there wa~o justification for the 
Missouri deviations while in Texas there was an effort to 
preserve county lines. This latter point requires two 
caveats. An opinion here would heavily emphasize Mahin v. 
Howell and the respect for county lines there. Andp it 
would emphasize that they could not have gotten less dis-
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parities without breeching more lines. That is the case 
in Texas. The alternative plans submitted required 
decimation of 18 more counties to achieve populational 
equality. Second, Kirkpatrick does suggest that preservation 
of subdivision lines is not a valid justification in federal 
congressional cases. However, the Ct's opinion i~ in 
that case makes pretty clear that Missouri .did not offer 
any underlying reason for the desire to preserve county 
lines other than the desire to minimize political gerrymander-
ing. In the Texas case it may well be contended that there 
are valid, neutral principles justifying preservation so 
far as possible of traditional county lines. Here the Ct 
could take some of the affirmative county-line language from 
Mahin and from Reynolds. I@Caveat: This is not an entirely 
satisfactory way to distinguish and is sure to ddaw a 
dissent but I think it is sufficiently solid, especially 
in light of the alternatives, to warrant its adoption. 
Therefore, on the strength of the distinctions between 
this case and Kirkpatrick the DC may be reversed and the 
Plan reinstated. 
(2) Bullock v. Register, No. 72-147 
There are three issues here:I wi]l address each briefly. 
(1) Jurisdiction 
Because of Gunn v. Univ Comm to End the War this Ct 
does not have a clear ground for jurisdiction over the 
populational dis~arity aspect of this case, i.e. the DC 
did not enter an injunction, instead it specifically declined 
to enjoin the State 0 s plan. However, the DC did enter a 
-... s--
injunctive order with respect to Hallas and San Antonio. 
On one of two grounds this Ct might be said to have prmper 
jurisdiction over that aspect of the case. (1) Since the 
DC had jurisdiction, and since it entered an injunction, we 
need not decide whether the injunction itself was one of 
statewide impact. Any injunction entered, if the DC had 
jurisdiction ab initio, is satisfactory. (2) The law 
struck down, even though it applied only to Dallas and 
Bexar Counties, was nonetheless a law of statwide impact 
withdin the Court's pr~ior decisions. Moody v. Flowers 
involved the selection of county officials who would have 
only countywide jurisdictional power. New Left Mobilization 
involved a Bd of Regenst Rule in Texas which aplplied only 
on three of the 23 state college campuses in the State. 
While neither of those were statewide, the present law is 
because it concerns the selection of officials to state 
office in the House of Representatives for the State. They 
have power to pass on statewide legislation. 
Now, if it is decided that the Ct does have J·urisdiction --- --------over Dallas and Bexar counties, then as a matter of pendent 
jurisdiction it might reach the populational disparity - ---' 
argument. Recall in Roe v. Wade Justice Blackmun embraced 
a doctrine of pendent jurisdiction on the ground that it 
wo~e wasteful of judicial re~ources not to hear the 
m 
entire case once a significant segent of it is here. Also, 
it might be argued that both issues involve the same basic 
facts. Both turn on the actions of the Redistricting Bd. 
This overall theory gets this entire case before the Ct. 
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While I think this is an acceptable theory, it is not 
unalterably correct. Ir might be a~rgued on the basis 
of cases like Gunn and New Left that direct appeal juris-
diction has alwa~s been, and should continue to be, 
narrowly construed and that adoption of a doctrine of 
pendent jurisdiction here is an unwarranted extension of 
that jurisdictional power. 
(2) Populational disparity. 
The deviation for the House is 9.9%. You have asid 
that you regard it as controlled by Mahin v. Howell, because 
there 16.4 % was approved. However, a careful reading 
of Howell demonstrates that it is based on three factors: 
~~------------------~' 
(1) the state justified its de partures from equality 
(i.e. preservation of county lines); (2) the State 
closely adhered to its rationale, cutting only a single 
line in Fairfax County and that single deviation was fully 
explained; (3) it was conceded that no less populational 
deviation was possible in Virginia without breeching more 
lines. In theTexas case, these same factors would seem to --- -------..-. 
cut the other way. (1) Although the State _argued for pre~ 
s~io;:f county lines it cut 19 of them and it did so 
in a haphazard manner which it fails to explain or justify, 
showing that its rationale was not pursued with great 
seriousness as in Virginia. (2) The DC found that a 
closer approximation to equality could be achieved while 
cfuttiing the same number or lesser number of lines (it had 
aln alternative plan before it which did a better job). 
(\ / If the Ct now determines to disregard these distinguishing 
\~ factors, it will be, in effect, establishing a per se rule 
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that 16.4% (at least) is presumptively all right. I do 
not think that such a rule should be established for the 
reasons stated in my prior disclussion of the congressional 
case. 
(3) Multi-member districts. 
There are two independent theories for str~iking down 
the Dall and Bexar County districts, both are discussed 
at length in the DC opinion. 
(a) The Texas plan constitutes discrimination in violation 
of the equal protection clause between districts in the 
state. As we say in Rodriguezp this Ct has frequently 
held that a state may distinguish between districts but 
only where there is a rational basis for so doing (see 
McGowan v. Maryland, Salsbury v. Mariland, Griffin v. School 
Bd). Is there a rational basis for discriminating between 
Houston candidates and voters and those in Dallas and 
• 
San Antonio. Houston has single-member districts while the --
latter two had huge multi-member districts. The DC found 
~that very large multi-member districts,(especially with 
the other restrictions on the ballot in those areas), 
disadvantage poor candidates and supporters of poor cand-
idates. On a theory akin to Bullock v. Carter (the DC 
relied on the lower ct opinion in this case--Dies v. Carter--
since Bullock had not yet been decided) it is fair to 
conclude that such discrimination is "invideous." This 
theory is good because it rests on clear findings of fact 
supported by the record that (1) demographically Dallas and 
SA are indistinguishable from Houston; (2) that only an 
independently wealthy person could win in either Dallas 
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or San Antonio. The State has no justification for its 
discrimination. The State witnesses testified that they 
to 
were responding/the wishes of the local people in each 
place. But the record showied and the DC found that the 
Dallas people had indicated a desire for single-member districts 
and that the Bd had relied on the views of a few political 
cronies. This would be a narrow way to resolve the case 
without entering the Whitcomb v. Chavis thicket. 
(b) Under Whitcomb v. Chavis, Burns v. Richardson, and 
Fortson, the DC also held (and seven Justices agreed last 
Term when the case was here on a stay) that the m-m districts 
in Dallas and SA operated to exclude black and minority 
voters. An opinion could be written focusing on the 
converging operation of the place and residency requirements, 
the history of minority submergence in both cities, the 
operation of the DCRG and the CGG, and the effect of 
a large slate which inevitably cafries every seat. I 
regard this theory as valid but am a little reserved in my 
enthusiasm because it may nob be desirable for the Ct to 
reopen the m-m district dispute. Would a distinguishing 
job here encourage blacks in other m-m districts to renew 
their efforts despite the bar of Whitcomb.7 To a brge 
extent, of course, this would depend on how carefully the 
opinion was written. However, as Justcie White said in 
our ofifices last year, if this Dallas district is not 
invalid no m-m district anywhere could be found to be 
invalid. 
(3) Gaffney v. Cummings, 71-1476 
I ._ 
--a .... 
If you vote in Register to approve the 9.9% deviation 
from equality then this case is completely controlled and 
the 7.86% deviation in the House here must be approved. 
However, if you adopt the approach I suggested in 
Register of taking a careful look at Mahin v. Howell's 
ne 
articulated foundation, this case is a close o~. You 
have commented on the grotesque political gerrymandered 
districts in this case. If you still think this case 
a bothersome one then the following rationale would 
seem appropriate. 
Mahin expresses that deviations are tolerable where 
the~ are justified and where the justification is adhered 
to. The State of Connecticut offers two justifications for 
its 7.8% deviation. (1) Preservation of town lines; (2) 
political fairness. Under the Mahin theory it is clear 
that the first justification falls because the State cut 
41 town lines, demonstrating no clear desire to preserve 
that as an overriding interest. (2) Political fairness, 
or political gerrymandering as the appellees refer to it, ----- -raises a difficult question. This Ct has dodged in s everal 
> 
r--
cases the question whether gerrymandering is per se uncon-
stitutional. My guess is that, mf pushed, the Court would 
----conclude that it is nonjusticiable and, in a sense, in
evitable and dangerous in the long run. But, it is fair 
to conclude as the DC in this case did, that whatever its 
validity it is not a sufficient justification for deviations 
---.._ - -------from populational equality. Here the DC fould that a 
closer approximation could have been easily achieved but for 
this tortured desire to preserve a numerical parity of 
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Democratic and Repoblican seats. 
There is still the question of the ~Senate seats, where 
there was also considerable political gerrymandering but 
a much closer approximatifon to equality (less than 2%). 
I would not knock that down under the theory expressed in ----- ..... -
the former paragraph but it is difficult to say anything 
about that aspect of the case. The DC did not focus parti-
cular attention on it and the briefs barely mention the 
Senate. If that aspect of the case requires the Ct for the 
first time to decide whether gerrymandering is unconsti-
tutional, it is a most undesirable circumstance. Instead 
of reaching the senate question, however, I would hold that 
since the State must start over with the House, and since it 
has apparently tried trn treat the House and the Senate as 
a single operative unity, it would probably wish to consider 
anew its senate districting to make it compatible with its 
new house scheme. Moreover, we simply to not have the sort 
of focused record and argument necessary to decide the Sejnate 
question. 
Final caveat: It may be appropriate on the other side 
of this case to look at the number of people constituting 
~ 
1 the populational disparity. In Missouri in Kirkpatrick 
I I 
, the 5.9% deviation comprehended about 20,000 peple, whereas 
\ the 7.86 deviation inthe House and the 2.% deviation in the 
Senate in Connecticut involved only 800 or so people. It ---
might, therefore, be argued that where the numbers make 
such a great difference a greater percentage is permissible 
where til~~~ smaller units of government are involved. 
LAH 
REAPPORTIONMENT NOTES 
·Bullock v. Register, No. 72-147 
I. State of Texas' Brief 
f\. Populo.ti•n 
(1} Populational disparities of 9.9% do not have to 
be justified at all. Reynolds mandates only "substantial" 
equality or "approximate" equality. It requires of the 
State that it act in "good faith." Swann v. Adams 
recognized that de minimus .deviations are unavoidable 
Kirkpatrick undermines the tolerance for de min~imus de-
viations but that is a Congressional ca.se. Reynolds 
and Connor v. Williams recognine that a looser standard 
should apply to the States. The State would argue that, 
so long as the State acts in good faith, its plan will be 
approved where deviations from exactitude are not 
substantial. 
(2} If some justification is required, Texas 
has met it in its preservation of county lines. This 
is a policy mandated by the State Const; it was required 
by the Texas SC in Smith v. Craddick; in Kirkpatrick 
the county integrity argument appeared hollow and 
after-the-fact (A belated attempt to squeeze within 
Reynolds}; also there the State could have come closer 
w/o breeching its own justification; also lower 
deviation plans were before the ~i State legislature. 
The State need not persuade the DC that its policy is a 
good or important one, only that it is rational and 
legitimate. 
(3) The mathematical exactitude standard is seriously 
flawed. Note in Reynolds that the Ct said that mathematical 
exactness "is hardly a workable constitutional requirement." 
Census statistics often undercount minority groups; 
population statistics do not accurately reflect voting 
statistics; census alome does not account for shifts 
in population over a decade. 
(4) Waht @ practicalities of the political process? 
Talks of the "political impact" of any scheme and the need 
for "play in the joints." Compromise is the life blood 
of the poli~ical process. 
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c. Multi-member districts--SAN ANTONIO 
Here findings are less persuasive with regard to 
Whitcomb than even Dallas. 
II. Appellee (Texas Repub Party)II--Tom Gee; Terry Bray 
Factual disputess Texas argued in DC that it had no obli-
gation to explain existing disparities; refused to submit 
an alternative plan; the DC found that the State had follow-
ed its own justification--county lines--only fitfully 
(cuts 19 counties, but only one "small" county) 
A. Dallas & San Antonio 
There is no rational basis for discrimination against 
D and SA and in favor of Houston w respect to sungle-
member districts. May have been a product of time pressure; 
or politics but the DC found the cities to be identical 
in all important respects. 
This Ct has said that single-member districts are 
preferrable all other things being equal in Connor v. 
Williams. The Ct has also said that either is permissible 
in Whitcomb, Burns, Fortson. 
These are not ordinary m-m districts. (1) They are 
very large and, therefore, require expensive campaigns 
to win. The proof was that it is virtually impossible 
to win w/o the support of the Dallas machine. (2) Both 
areas have significant minority pockets. 
Relies on Bullock for the impact on the impecunious. 
What justification? (1) Local citizens prefer it. 
DC and record refute this claim. Does not concede that 
majority preference would be an acceptable justification 
(p. 30). (2) Policy of providing single-m districts 
when there were 1,000,000 residents. But Dallas was 
1.3 million and there is no rationale of that rule of 
thumb. 
B. Populational Variances 
(1) Good faith explanation is lacking in view of the 
manner in which the Plan was adopted. It was the product 
of Spelling.s. an aid to BarnA!'< hlhn 't.T!lQ •··'" ; .... .,. ......... ~ ... ~~~ 
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The DC did two thingss (1) declared that the 
State H of R was malapportioned, but it did not enter 
an injunction, giving the State a chance to act; (2) 
ordered Dallas & Bexar counties reapportioned. 
Steps in the analysis. Gunn was a DC declaratory judgment 
that a State law was unconstitutional but refusing 
to enter an injunction until after next legislative 
session. Whitcomb v. Chavis, fn 19, DC held state legis 
reapportionment invalid but sitayed injunction until after 
next legislature. 
The Dallas SA aspect of the case will not support a 
direct ap~eal. Moodly v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97--no 
statewide application. Bd of Regents, and Skolnick. 
III. State's reply to Jurisdictional argument 
Focuses on the appealability of the injunction w respect 
to the two cities. Contends that this Ct has jurisdiction 
if the case is one properly before a three-judge ct and 
if an injunction or entered. It is not correct to look 
only to the impact of the order. The first argument then is 
that the law need not be of statewide applicability. 
The State then argues that the injunction is one having 
statewide impact. In Moody they were county officials, 
having local authority only. Here they are state officials 
havi#ng statewide power 
Once it establishes that the Dallas & Bexar County 
portions of the case are before us, it gets in the 
state reapportionment scheme as a matter of pendent 
jurisdiction. Both involve examintaion of the 
proceedings of the Reditricting Bd. Relies on Roe v. 
Wade. Its argument is essentially one of juaicial 
economy. 
(Examination of case law on jurisdictional q.) 
Gunn v. University Comm to End the War, 399 U.S. 383 
(1970). Antiwar demonstrators were arrested during a 
LBJ speech in Texas under the Texas disturbing toe peace 
statute. They filed suit in a three-j ct to enjoin the 
statute. The DC held that law unconstitutional as 
overbroad. After saying that they were entitled to 
- .,_ 
This Ct held that it has no jur'is because the order 
is not one granting or denying an injunction. This 
is not a mere "tecnicality" said the Ct. Congress 
required that the law be narrow,ty construed. And, 
it is not possible to know what the Ct has de-
cided. 
Whitcomb v. Chavis. 403 U.S. 124 (1971) 
Here the DC found improper districting and malapportionment 
of the State legis but declined to issue an injunctive order. 
Instead it withheld judgment giving the State legislature 
a chance to reapportion itself. Fn 19 says that this Ct 
does not have jurisdiction because no injunction was grant-
ed or denied, citing Gunn. 
This case was fild by residents of Indiana challenging 
multi-member districts for the state house and senate 
for Marion County. The DC agreed with the suit and 
decided that full state reapportionment was required, 
but it said "An injunction will not is:sue at this time" 
in order to give the Governor a chance to call a 
special session. The Governor appealed directly to this 
Court. On March 16, 1970 this Ct noted probable 
jurisdiction.lj#id#i# One week later, it revoked its 
prior note and noted, instead, the appeal by the Governor 
from the ensuing final judgment. 397 U.S. 984. Then it 
decided the appeal from the formal injunction and 
dismissed the previous one. 403 U.S. 914, citing Gunn. 
Bd of Regents v. New Left Education Project, 404 U.S. 
The term "statute" in 2281 d<hes not include a "state statute 
having only local impact, even if administered by a state 
official." Holds that the Bd of Regents Rules were not of 
statewide applicability. Although the brief accuses 
the Ct of overruling Alabama State Teachers Ass'n, 393 
U.S. 400, and the dissent in New Left (WOD) does also, 
the majority distinguishes it on the ground that it w~s~ 
an attack upon a local impact having the effect of being 
expressive of a statewi~e policy of racial discrimination. 
Alabama State Teachers is a PC affirmance w/o opinion. 
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Board of Revenue and Control, and challenged Suffolk Cty 
Bd of Supervisors. These were held not to be laws of 
statewide applicability, even though they were like other 
local laws in the State. 
Other cases reversed in light of Gunn: 
(1) Fontane v. Dial,303 F. Supp. 436 (1969) (WD Texas--
Thornberry, Spears, Suttle) 
P is manager of movie theatre; Ds are the local ass't DA 
and his assistant; they obtained a search warrant to seize 
the film w/o a prior adversary hearing. The DC held that 
the state law allowing seizure w/o prior adversary hearing 
violated the first and 4th amendments. The DC said: 
.:fi"The procedures defendants used in seizing 
the motion picture film, trailers, and display posers, 
as evidence dfor future criminal procedutions against 
plaintiffs under article 527, are hereby declared 
unconstitutional, and defendants are ~~ordered to 
return the seized materials to plaintiffs. In 
addition, defendants are prohibited from utilizing 
the provisions of section 6 of said statute, unless 
a prior adversary hearing is afforded the party 
against whom 'any writs and processes •.. are 
sought. 
"Inasmuch as defendants have represented in open 
Court that they will abide by any final decision 
reached herein, it is not deemed necessary at this time 
to grant injunctive relief to the plaintiff. However, 
in the event this judgment is not complied with 
in good faith, this Ct will entertain further request 
for such relief." 
399 U.S. 521 dismissed for want of jurisdiction, citing 
Gunn. WOD dissented. 
(2) Hutcherson v. Lehtin,313 F. Supp. 1324 (ND Cal 1970--
Duniway, Sweigert, Levin) 
This was a tenants' suit against landlords challenging 
the constitutionality of the California unlawful de~ainer 
statute on the ground that it impermi~bly limits the 
defenses that may be raised, includin 1 hat ~iction was 
in retaliation for reporting code v~ations~breach by 
landlord of coven~nt to repair, an onconformity of 
premises to municipal code. The DC abstained as to the 
first claim to allow the state cts to decide whether 
that defense may be raised, and denied a consti viol on 
the latter two. 
This Ct, 399 U.S. 522, dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 
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I cannot tell for sure w/o reviewing the briefsl but 
this is the only logical explanation since it is clear that 
the DC did deny an injunction with respect to the 2d and 
3d defenses. 
(3) Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.Supp. 293 (ED Wise. 1970--
Kerner, Reynolds, Gordon--PC) 
P was a physician prosecuted in a state ct under a 
state anti-abortion statute which made it unlawful to perform 
n abortion except to save the life of the mother. On 
the basis of notions of abstention and also because of 
the bar of 2283 (pre-Younger) the DC refused to issue 
an injunction against the pending state prosecution but 
it did go on to declare the law unconstitutmonal. 
This Ct, 400 U.S. 1, said "appeal dismissed," citing 




ISSUES in Bullock v. Register · · 
(1) Supreme Ct jurisdiction under 1253. Inclined to 
agree with explanation in State's reply brief. Scope 
of injunction is unimportant if case was properly befpre 
the DC and, in any event, the order was one of statewide 
applicability. The populational disaprity argument 
could be treated as pendent under a Roe v. Wade 
analysis. 
(2) Populational disparities. 9.9% is not so de minimus 
as to require no justification at all. Rem in Abate v. 
Mundt 11.9% was allowed but this was a narrow opinion and 
was supported by a strong and consistently maintained 
rationale. 
The State's justification is weak in view of 19 
deviations. Case here is primarily a comparison to 
Mahin v. Howell where, as I recall, the rational had 
been closely adhered to. 
(3) Multi-member districts 
The first confusing question is which theory to 
apply. Should this be treated as a straight Whitcomb 
case in which we look for proof that m-m districts 
operate to disenfranchise minorities? Or, should 
the wealth discrimination argument be made. And, if 
that is to be the course, what is the controlling test? 
If the m-m districts in Dallas are not impermissible 
then no m-m districts could ever be. The Negro in Dallas 
is politically subservient .to the DCBG since that is the 
only way to get elected. (Note the amicus figures indicating 
the success of single-member districts.) 
DC PC in Bullock v. Regester, · No. 72-147 
P. 14--State made no effort to explain any deviations from 
equality. 
P. 18--The State itself has not complied with Smith and 
has not explained the rationale that makes its desire to 
preserve local boundaries so importamt. 
No rational is offered for distinctions between multi-m 
and single-m districts. The Bd did not consider or explain 
the difference. The million-resident rationale of Kilgarlin . 
was violated here; there is nothing in the record to 
support the grassroots support notion. 
DC relying on cases such as the DC opinion in Bullock vT 
Carter says if it disadvantages candidates because of their 
wealth it must meet compelling state interest test. 
P. 29--DC refrains from holding m-m districts per se in-
valid as discriminatoyy against the poor because the recrod 
is too thin to support such action and because it may not 
constitute "invideous discrimination." 
The DC follows a straight Bullock argument. M-m dist 
candidates and voters in some areas are disadvantaged 
on the basis of wealth and the State has shown no compelling 
state interest. 
P. 35--Finds no rational basis for the discrimination between 
candidaites and voters in Dallas and Houston. 
The DC applied the test of Whitcomb separately and found 
i~l#~~dthat it met the required level of proof of a 
system operating to dilute the vote of racial minorities. 
Makes a similar finding w respect to SA and Mexican-Amer-
icans. Focuses on the history of mistreatment and 
discrimination and being blocked out of the policical 
process. 
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Bob Bullock et al. , Appellants, On Appeal from the 
United States District v. 
Diana Regester et al. 
Court for the Western 
District of Texas. 
[May - , 1973] 
MR. JusTICE W,JJITE delivered the ~nion of the 
Court. ~ ~ ~~· rp~ 
Thi:-c~tsflons conc~1ing the validity 
of the reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Rep-
resentatives adopted in 1970 by the State Legislative Re-
districting Board: First, whether there were unconstitu-
tionally large variations in popula.tion among the districts 
defined by the plan; second, whether the multimember 
districts provided for Bexar and Dallas Counties were 
properly found to have been invidiously discriminatory 
against cognizable racial or ethnic groups in those 
counties. 
The Texas Constitution requires the state legislature 
to reapportion the House and Senate at its first regular 
session following the decennial census. Tex. Const ., 
Art. III, § 28.1 In 1970, the legislature proceeded to 
1 Article III, § 28, of t he Texas Constitution provide~ : 
"The Legislature shall, at its first regula r session a ft er the publi-
cation of each United States decennial census, apportion to the state 
into senatorial and representative districts, agreeable to the provisions 
of Sections 25, 26, and 26-a of this Article. In the event the Legis-
lature shall at any such first regular session following the publication 
of a United States decennial census, fail to make such apportionment, 
same shall be done by the Legislature Redistricting Board of Texas, 
which is hereby created, and shall be composed of fi.v<' (5) members, 
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reapportion the House of Representatives but failed to 
agree on a redistricting plan for the Senate. Litigation 
was immediately commenced in state court challenging 
the constitutionality of the House reapportionment. 
The Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature's 
plan for the House violated the Texas Constitution.2 
as follows: The Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, the Attorney General, the Comptroller of Public 
Accounts and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a major-
ity of whom shall constitute a quorum. Said Board shall assemble in 
the City of Austin within ninety (90) days after the final adjournment 
of such regular session. The Board shall , within sixty (60) days 
after assembling, apportion the state into senatorial and representa-
tive districts, or into senatorial or representative districts, as the 
failure of action of such Legislature may make necessary. Such 
apportionment shall be in writing and signed by three (3) or more 
of the members of the Board duly acknowledged as the act and deed 
of such Board, and, when so executed nnd filed with the Secretary 
of State, shall have force and effect of law. Such apportionment shall 
become effective at the next succeeding stntewide general election. 
The Supreme Court of Texas shall have jurisdiction to compel such 
Commission ot perform its duties in accordance with the provisions 
of this section by writ of mandamus or other extraordinary writs 
conformable to the usages of law. ThP Legislature shall provide 
necessary funds for clerical and technical aid and for other expenses 
incidental to the work of the Board, and the Lieutenant Governor 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be entitled to 
receive per diem anJ travel expense during the Board's session in 
the same manner and amount as they would receive while attending 
a special session of the Legislature. This amendment shall become 
effective .January 1, 1951. As amended Nov. 2, 1948." 
2 The Court held that the plan violated Art. III, § 26, of the Texas 
Constitution, which provides: 
"The members of the House of Representatives shall be appor-
tioned among the several counties, according to the number of popu-
lation in each, as nearly as may be, on a ratio obtainrd by dividing 
the population of the State, as ascertained by thr most recent Unitrd 
States census, by the number of members of which the House is 
composed; provided, that whenever a single county has sufficient 
population to be entitled to a Represrntative, such county shal1 qe 
' . 
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Smith v. Craddick, 471 S. W. 2d 375 (Tex. 19-71). Mean-
while, pursuant to the requirements of the Texas Con-
stitution, a Legislative Redistricting Board had been 
formed to begin the task of redistricting the Texas Senate. 
Although the Board initially confined its work to the 
:reapportionment of the Senate, it was eventually ordered, 
in light of the judicial invalidation of the House plan, 
to also reapportion the House. Mauzy v. Legislative 
Redistricting Board, 471 S. W. 2d 570 (Tex. 1971). 
On October 15, 1971, the Redistricting Board's plan for 
the reapportionment of the Senate was released, and, on 
October 22, 1971, the House plan was promulgated. 
Only the House plan remains at issue in this case. That 
plan divided the 150-member body among 79 single-
member and 11 multimember districts. Four lawsuits, 
eventually consolidated, were filed challenging the 
Board's Senate and House plans and asserting with re-
spect to the House plan that it contained impermissible 
deviations from population equality and that its multi-
member districts for Bexar County and Dallas County 
operated to dilute the voting strength of racial and ethnic 
minorities. 
A three-judge District Court sustained the Senate 
plan, but found the House plan unconstitutional. 
'- ~ ------~----------------Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (WD Tex. 1972). 
The House plan was held to contain constitutionally 
impermissible deviations from population equality, and 
the multimember districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties 
formed into a separate Representative District, and when two or 
more counties are required to make up the ratio of representation , 
such counties shall be contiguou to each other; and when any one 
county has more than sufficient population ro be entitled to one or 
more Representatives, such Representative or Representatives shall 
be apportioned to such county, and for any ;;urplus of population it 
may be joined in a Representative Dist rict with any othE>r contiguotv; 
cotmty or countief)." · 
' . 
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were deemed constitutionally invalid. The District 
Court gave the Texas Legislature until July 1, 1973, to 
reapportion the House, but the District Court permitted 
the Board's plan to be used for purposes of the 1972 
election, except for requiring that the Dallas County 
and Bexar County multimember districts be reconstituted 
into single-member districts for the 1972 election. 
The State appealed the statewide invalidation of the 
House plan and the substitution of single-member for 
multimember districts in Dallas County and Bexar 
County.3 MR. JusTICE PowELL denied a stay of the 
judgment of the District Court, 405 U. S. 1201, and we 
noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U. S. 840. 
I 
We deal at the outset with the challenge to our juris-
diction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, which 
permits injunctions in suits required to be heard and 
determined by a three-judge district court to be ap-
pealed directly to this Court.4 It is first suggested that 
the case was not one required to be heard by a three-
judge court. The contention is frivolous. A statewide 
reapportionment statute was challenged and injunctions 
were asked against its enforcement. The constitutional 
questions raised were not insubstantial on their face, and 
the complaint clearly called for the convening of a three-
judge court. That the court declared the entire appor-
3 In a separate nppeal, we summarily affirmed that portion of the 
judgment of the District Court upholding the Senate plan. Archer 
v. Smith, 409 U. S. 808 (1972). 
4 28 U. S. C. § 1253 provider:;: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to 
the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice 
and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil 
action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be 
heard and determined by a district court of three judge~' . " 
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tionment plan invalid, but entered an injunction only 
with respect to its implementation for the 1972 elections 
in Dallas and Bexar Counties, in no way indicates that 
the case required only a single judge. The State is there-
fore properly here on direct appeal with respect to the 
injunction dealing with Bexar and Dallas Counties, for 
the order of the court directed at those counties was 
literally an order "granting ... an ... injunction in 
any civil action ... required . . . to be heard and de-
termined by a district court of three judges'' within the 
meaning of § 1253. 
We also hold that the State, because it appealed from 
the entry of an injunction, is entitled to review of the 
District Court's accompanying declaration that the pro-
posed plan for the Texas House of Representatives, in-
cluding those portions providing for multimember dis-
tricts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, was invalid state-
wide. This declaration was the predicate for the court's 
order requiring Dallas and Bexar to be reapportioned into 
single districts, for its order that "unless the Legislature 
of the State of Texas on or before July 1, 1973, has 
adopted a plan to reapportion the legislative districts 
within the State in accordance with the constitutional 
guidelines set out in this opinion this court will so appor-
tion the State of Texas" ; and for ordering the Secretary 
of State to "adopt and implement any and all procedures 
necessary to properly effectuate the orders of this Court 
in conformance with this Opinion . ... " In these cir-
cumstances, although the State could not have directly 
appealed to this Court the entry of a declaratory judg-
ment unaccompanied by any injunctive relief, Gunn v. 
University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970); Mitchell 
v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 ( 1970) , we conclude that we 
have jurisdiction of the State's entire appeal. Roe v. 
Wade,- U. S. - (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers v, Jacobson, 362 U. S. 73 (1960) . With the 
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Texas reapportionment plan before it, it was in the inter-
est of judicial economy and the avoidance of piecemeal 
litigation that three-judge District Court have jurisdiction 
over all claims raised against the statute when a substan-
tial constitutional claim was alleged, and an appeal to 
us, once properly here, has the same reach. Roe v. Wade, 
supra, at -; Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. S. 320 
(1970); Florida Lime &: Avocado Growers v. Jacobson, 
supra, at 80. 
II 
The reapportionment plan for the Texas House of 
Representatives provides for 150 representatives to be 
selected from 79 single-member and 11 multimember 
districts. The ideal district is 74,645 persons. The dis-..,_______...__------
tricts range from 71,597 to 78,943 in population per rep-
resentative, or from 5.8 1o overrepresentation to 4.1 % 
underrepresentation. The total variatio.D between larg-
est and smallest district is thus 9.9 %.5 
The District Court read our pr:ro;cases to require any 
deviations from equal population among districts to be 
justified by "acceptable reasons" grounded in state 
policy; relied on Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 
( 1969) , to conclude that the permissible tolerances sug-
gested by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), had 
been substantially eroded; suggested that Abate v. 
Mundt, 403 U. S. 182 (1971) , in accepting total devia-
tions of 11.9 % in a county reapportionment was sui 
generis; and considered the "critical issue" before it to 
be whether "the State [has] justified any and all vari-
ances, however small, on a basis of a consistent, rational 
State policy." 343 F. Supp., at 713. Noting the single 
fact that the total deviation from the ideal between Dis-
trict 3 and District 85 was 9.9 %, the District Court. 
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concluded that justification by the State was called for 
and could discover no acceptable state policy to support 
the deviations. The District Court was also critical of 
the actions and procedures of the Legislative Reappor-
tionment Board and doubted "that [the] board did the 
~ort of deliberative job ... worthy of judicial abstinence." 
Id., at 717. It also considered the combination of single-
member and multimember districts· in the House plan 
was "haphazard," particularly in providing single-member 
districts in Houston and multimembet districts in other 
metropolitan areas, and that this "irrationality, without 
reasoned justification, may be a separate ground for de-
claring the entire plan unconstitutional." 6 Finally, the 
court specifically invalidated the use of multimember· 
districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties as unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory against a racial or ethnic group .. 
The District Court's ultimate conclusion was that "the 
apportionment plan for the State of Texas is unconstitu-
tional as unjustifiably remote from the ideal of 'one man,. 
one vote' and that the multi-member districting schemes 
for the House of Representatives as they relate specifically· 
6 It may be, although we are not sure, that the District Court 
would have invalidated the plan statewide because of what it thought 
was an irrational mixture of multi- and single-member districts: 
Thus in questioning the use of single-member districts in Houston 
but multimember districts in all other urban areas, and remarkmg 
that the State had provided neither "compelling" nor "rational" 
explanation for the differing treatment, the District Court merely 
concluded that this cla sification "may be" an independent ground 
for invalidating the plan. But there are not authorities in this 
Court for the proposition that the mere mixture of multi- and single-
member districts in a single plan, even among urban areas, is in-
vidiously discriminatory , and we construe the remark::; not as part 
of the District Court's declaratory judgment invalidating the state 
plan but as mere advance advice to the Texas Legislature a~ to what. 
would or would not be acceptable to thr D1strict Cout.t.~ 
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to Dallas and to Bexar Counties are unconstitutional in 
that they dilute the votes of racial minorities." I d., at 
735·.7 
Insofar as the District Court's judgment rested on the 
conclusion that the population differential of 9.97u from 
the ideal district between District 3 and District 85 
made out a prima facie equal protection violation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, absent special justification, 
the coJ.lr.!:. was in error. It is plain from Mahan v. 
HoweU, 410 U.S. - ( 1970), and Gaffney v. Cummings, 
ante, p. -, that state reapportionment statutes are not 
subject to the same stnct stan ar s applica e o reap-
portionment o congress1ona seats. trlcpatrick v. 
Preisler d1 not e tolerances contemplated by 
ReynoLds v. Sims with respect to state districting and 
we did not hold in Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440 
(1967), or Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967), nor 
later in Mahan v. Howell , supm, that any deviations 
from absolute equality, however small, must be justified 
to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid invalidation 
under the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set 
out in Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, p. -, we do not 
consider relatively minor population deviations among 
st'iitelegiSiat!ve Clistricts to suostantially dilute the 
weight of mdlviauaiVotes-in-thelargerdistr'icts so as to 
deprive incrrv1au3:1Siii'these districts of fair and effective 
representation. Those reasons are as applicable to Texas 
as they are to Connecticut; and we cannot glean an 
equal protection violation from the single fact that two 
legislative districts in Texas differ from one another by 
7 The District Court also concluded, contrary to the assertions of 
certain plaintiffs, that the Senate districting scheme for Bexar County 
did not "unconstitutionally dilute thC' votes of any political faction 
or party." The majority of the District Court also concluded that 
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as much as 9.9%, when compared to the ideal district. / 
Very likely, larger differences between districts woul~, 
d-"'....--_,net-be-to1entble without justification "based on legitimate 
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational 
state policy," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S., at 579; Mahan 
v. Howell, supra, at -, but here we are confident that 
appellees failed to carry their burden of proof insofar 
as they sought to establish a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause from population variations alone. The 
total variation between two districts was 9.9%, but the 
average deviation of all H?use districts from the ideal 
was 1.82%. Only 23 districts, all single-member, 
were over or underrepresented by more than 3% , 
and only three of those districts by more than 5·% . 
We are unable to conclude from these deviations alone 
that appellees satisfied the threshold requirement of prov-
ing a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Because the District Court 
had a contrary view, its judgment must be reversed in 
this respect.8 
III 
We affirm the District Court's judgment, however, 
insofar as it invalidated the multimember districts in Dal-
8 The Court's conclusion that the variations in this case were not 
jiJstified by a rational state policy would . in any event, require re-
consideration and reversal under Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. -
(1973). The Texas Constitution, Art. III , § 26, expresses the state 
policy against cutting county lines wherever possible in forming 
representative districts. The District Court recognized the. policy 
but, without the benefit of Mahan v. Howell, may have thought the 
variations too great to be justified by that policy. It perhaps 
thought also that the policy had not been sufficient ly or consistently 
followed here. But it appears to us that to stay w1thin tolerable 
population limits it was nece~sary to cut some county lines and that 
the State achieved a constitutionally acceptable accommodation be-
tween population principles and its policy aga mst cutting county 
lines in forming representative district~. 
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las and Bexar Counties and ordered those districts to be· 
redrawn into single-member districts. Plainly, under our 
cases, multimember districts are not per se unconstitu-
tional, nor are they necessarily unconstitutional when 
used in combination withS!ngle-member distri~tsin other 
parlSOI the State~ Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 
(1971) ;Ma!U:tn v. Howell, 410 U. S. - (1973); see 
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 ( 1964); Fortson v. 
Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth 
General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 ( 1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964).9 But we have entertained 
claims that multimember districts-a;; beingused!nvidi-
ously to ~ncel out orminimiZe the voting stre11th of 
- ------------- ~- - - -racial groups. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Burns v. 
RUli:ardian, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey, supra. To sustain )\ 
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group al-
legedly discriminated agamst as not ha legislative seats 
in ~otential. Tne plaintiffs' bur-
den is to roCluce-e'Vidence to support fii1dmgs tnat the 
political processes lea mg o nommatwn and election 
were not equiny opento partiCipatiOn by the group in 
question-tliat Its meml5ers had less opportunity than 
did other residents in the district to participate in the 
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149-150. 
With due regard for these standards, the District Court 
first referred to the history of official racial discrimination 
in Texas, which at ~toucfiea tfle right of Negroes 
to register and vote and to participate in the democratic 
9 See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 141-148 (1971), and 
the cases discussed in n. 22 of that opinion, including Kilgarlin v. 
Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967), where we affirmed the District Court's 
rejection of petitioners' contention that the combination of single-
member, multimember, and floterial districts in a single reappor-
tionment plan was "an unconstitutional 'crazy quilt.'" 386 U. S., 
[\.t 121, 
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proceeses. 343 F. Supp. , at 725. It referred also to the 
Texas rule requiring a majority vote as a prerequisite to 
nomination in a primary electi®~nd to the eo-called 
"place" rule limiting candidacy for legislative offiice from 
a multimember district to a specified "place" on the 
ticket, with the result being the election of representa .. 
· tives from the Dallas multimember district reduced to 
a head-to-head contest for each position. These char;. 
acteristics of the Texas electoral system, the District 
Court thought, enhanced the opportunity for racial dis-
crimination.10 More fundamentally, it found that since 
Reconstruction days, there have been only two Negroes 
in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of 
Representatives and that these two were the only two 
Negroes ever slated by the Dallas Committee for Re-
sponsible Government (DCRG), a white-dominated or-
ganization that is in effective control of Democratic Party 
candidate-slating in Dallas County.11 That organization, 
the District Court found, did not need the support of 
the Negro community to win elections in the county, and 
it did not therefore exhibit good-faith concern for the 
political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro 
community. The court found that as recently as 1970 
the DCRG was relying upon "racial campaign tactics in 
white precincts to defeat candidates who had the over-
whelming support of the black community." !d., at 
727. Based on the evidence before it, the District Court 
concluded that "the black community has been effectively 
excluded from participation in the Democratic primary 
10 There is no requirement that candidates reside in subdistricts 
of the multimember district. Thus, all candidatPs may be selPcted 
from outside the Negro residentia I area. 
11 The District Court found that "it is extremely diffi cult to secun' 
either a representative seat in the Dallas County delega tion or the 
Democratic primary nomination without the Pndorsement of the 
Dallas Committee for Responsible Government .'' 343 F. Supp. 726, 
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selection process," id., at 726, and was therefore generally 
not permitted to enter into the political process in a 
reliable and meaningful manner. These findings and 
conclusions are sufficient to sustain the District Court's 
judgment with respect to the Dallas multimember dis-
trict and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb 
them. 
IV 
The same is true of the order requiring disestablish-
ment of the multimember district in Bexar County. 
Consistently with Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 
(1954), the District Court considered the Mexican-
Americans in Bexar County to be an identifiable class for 
Fourteenth Amendment purposes and proceeded to in-
quire whether the impact of the multimember district 
on this group constituted invidious discrimination. Sur-
veying the historic and present condition of the Bexar 
County Mexican-American community, which is concen-
trated for the most part on the west side of the City of 
San Antonio, the court observed, based upon prior cases 
and the record before it, that the Bexar community, along 
with other Mexican-Americans in Texas, t z had long "suf-
fered from, and continues to suffer from, the results and 
effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the 
fields of education, employment, economics, health, poli-
tics, and others.'' 343 F. Supp., at 728. The bulk of 
the Mexican-American community in Bexar County oc-
cupied the Barrio, an area consisting of about 28 con-
tiguous census tract in the City of San Antonio. Over 
78% of Barrio residents were Mexican-Americans, making 
up 29% of the county's total population. The Barrio 
is an area of poor housing; its residents have low income, 
poor education, and a high rate of unemployment. The 
12 Mexican-Americans constituted approximately 20% of the popu-
littion of the State of Texas. 
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typical Mexican-American suffers a cultural and language 
barrier u that makes his participation in community proc~ 
esses extremely difficult, particularly, the court thought, 
with respect to the political life of Bexar County. "A 
cultural incompatibility ... fostered by a deficient edu-
cational system ... conjoined with the poll tax and 
the most restrictive voter registration procedures in the 
nation have operated to effectively deny Mexican-
American access to the political processes in Texas even 
longer than the Blacks were formally denied access by 
the white primary." 343 F. Supp., at 731. The residual 
impact of this history reflected itself in the fact that 
Mexican-American voting registration remained very 
poor in the county and that, although they now occupy 
a plurality in Bexar County, only five Mexican-
Americans since 1880 have served in the Texas Legislature 
from that county. Of these, only two were from the 
Barrio area.H The District Court also concluded from 
the evidence that the Bexar County legislative delegation 
in the House was insufficiently responsive to Mexican-
American interests. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Dis-
trict Court evolved its ultimate assessment of the multi-
member district, overlaid, as it was, on the cultural and 
economic realities of the Mexican-American community 
in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the 
county. Its judgment was that Bexar County Mexican-
Americans "are effectively removed from the political 
processes of Bexar [County] in violation of all of the 
1 8 The District Court found that ' ' [t]he fact that [Mexican-
Americans] are rea red in a subculture in which a dialect of Spanish 
is the primary language provides permanent impediments to their 
educational and vocational advancement :wd creates other traumatic 
problems." 343 F . Supp., at 730. 
H Two other residents of the Barrio, a Negro and an Anglo~ 
American, have also served in the Texa~ Legislature. 
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Whitcomb standards, whatever their absolute numbers 
may total in that County." !d., at 733. Single-member 
districts were thought required to remedy "the effects 
of past and present discriminations against Mexican-
Americans," id., and to bring the community into the 
full stream of political life of the county and State by 
~ncouraging their further registration, voting, and other 
political activities. ~<JJ_()"-' 
The District Court ap rently paid due heed to Whit- ' --( 
comb v. Cham's, supra, did not hold that every racial or 
political group has a const1ttitioi1al right to be represented 
in the state legislature, but dH:1, Irom !ts · own special 
vantage point, conCTude thatthe mU'i:tllne~er CITStrict, 
as~d and opera eel m BexarCounty, invidiously 
excluaealvrexican-A~e;re;:;s fr~ective participation 
in political life, specifically !n the election of representa-
tives to the Texas House of Representatives. On the 
record before us, we are not inclined to overturn these 
findings, representing as they do a blend of history and 
an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of 
the Bexar County multimember district in the light of 
past and present reality, political and otherwise. 
Affirme.d in part, reversed in part . 
' . 
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF WHITE, J. 
The Redistricting Board's plan embodied the following districts: 
Percent 
Average Deviation 
Multi- (Under) Over 
District Population Member Over (Under) 
1 76,285 1,640 2.2 
2 77,102 2,457 3.3 
3 78,943 4,298 5.8 
4 71 ,928 (2,717) (3.6) 
5 75,014 369 .5 
6 76,051 1,406 +.9 
7 (3) 221,314 73,771 ( 874) (l.Zl 
8 74,303 ( 342) ( .5 
9 76 ,8Ul 2,168 2.9 
10 72,410 (2,235) (3.0) 
11 73,136 (1,509) (2 .0) 
12 74,704 59 .1 
13 75,929 1,284 1.7 
14 76,597 1,952 2.6 
15 76,701 2,056 2.8 
16 74,218 ( 427l ( .6) 
17 72,941 (1 ,704 (2.3) 
18 77,159 2,514 3.4 
19 (2) 150,209 75,104 459 .6 
20 75,592 947 1.3 
21 74,651 6 .0 
22 73 ,311 (1,334) (1.8) 
23 75 ,777 1,132 1.5 
24 73 ,966 ( 679) ( .9) 
25 75,633 988 1.3 
26 (18) 1,327,321 73,740 ( 905) (1.2) 
27 77 ,788 3,143 4.2 
28 72,367 (2,278) (3.1) 
29 76,505 1,860 2.5 
30 77,008 2,363 3.2 
31 75,025 380 .5 
32 (9) 675,499 75,055 410 .5 
33 73,071 (l ,574) (2.1) 
34 76,071 1,426 1.9 
35 (2) 147,553 73,777 ( 868) (1.2) 
36 74,633 ( 12) ( .0) 
37 (4) 295,516 73,879 ( 766) (1.0) 
38 78,897 4,252 5.7 
39 77,363 2,718 :i.6 
40 71,597 (3,048) ( 4.1) 








Multi- (Under) Over 
District Population Member Over (Under) 
42 14,706 61 .1 
43 74,160 ( 485) ( .6) 
44 75,278 633 .8 
45 78,090 3,445 4.6 
46 (11) 826,698 75,154 509 .7 
47 76,319 1,674 2.2 
48 (3) 220,056 73,352 (1,293) (1.7) 
49 76,254 1,609 2.2 
50 74,268 ( 377) ( .5) 
51 75,800 1,155 1.5 
52 76,601 1,956 2.6 
53 74,499 ( 146) ( .2) 
54 77,505 2,860 3.8 
55 76,947 2,302 3.1 
56 74,070 ( 575) ( .S) 
57 77,211 2,566 3.4 
58 75,120 475 .6 
59 (2) 144,995 72 ,497 (2,148) (2.9) 
60 75,054 409 .5 
61 73,356 (1,289) (1.7) 
62 72,240 (2 ,405) (3.2) 
63 75,191 546 .7 
64 74,546 ( 99) ( .1) 
65 75,720 1,075 1.4 
66 72 ,310 (2 ,335) (3.1) 
67 75,034 389 .5 
68 74,524 ( 121) ( .2 ) 
69 74,765 120 .2 
70 77,827 3,182 4.3 
71 73,711 ( 934) (1.3) 
72 (4) 297,770 74,442 ( 203) ( .3) 
73 74,309 ( 336) ( .5) 
74 73 ,743 ( 902) (1.2) 
75 (2) 147,722 73 ,861 ( 784) (1.1) 
76 76,083 1,438 1.9 
77 77,704 3,059 4.1 
78 71,900 (2 ,745) (3.7) 
79 75,164 519 .7 
80 75,111 466 .6 
81 75,674 1,029 1.4 
82 76,006 1,361 1.8 
83 75,752 1,107 1.5 
84 75,634 989 1.3 
8i5 71,564 (3 ,081) ( 4.1) 
Continued 
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Multi- (Under) Over 
District Population Member Over (Under) 
86 73,157 (1 ,488) (2.0) 
87 73,045 (1 ,600) (2.1) 
88 75,076 431 .6 
89 74,206 ( 439) ( .6) 
90 74,377 ( 268) ( .4) 
91 73,381 (1 ,264) (1.7) 
92 71,908 (2,737) (3.7) 
93 72 ,761 (1,884) (2.5) 
94 73,328 (1 ,317) (1.8) 
95 73,825 ( 820) ( 1.1) 
96 72,505 (2,140) (2.9) 
97 74,202 ( 443) ( .6) 
98 72,380 (2 ,265) (3.0) 
99 74,123 ( 522) ( .7) 
100 75 ,682 1,037 1.4 
101 75,204 559 .7 
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.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
April 26, 1973 
Re: No. 72-147, Bullock v. Regester 
Dear Byron, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A ·. BLACKMUN 
~tm:t <!foud of tqt ~ttitt~ .jtattg 
._Rllltmghm. ~. <!f. 2llbT't.;t 
April 30, 1973 
Re: No. 72-147 - Bullock v. Regester 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. At conference I indicated concern 
about Bexar County, for I felt that the appellees had not sus-
tained thei r burden, particularly in light of the fact that 
Mexican-Americans now enjoy a county plurality. Your treat-
ment of this, however, is an effective one when it emphasizes 
the "intensely local appraisal, " and I am content to go along 
with you on your evaluation judgment. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
- ~ •'"'~"'-
· I wonder if you would consider making changes to accommodate 
the following suggestions: 
'ilill'· ~1:. 
· · -~ 1. On p. 12 of your opinion, Barrio (in San ':Antonio ) is described 
as an area of "poor education". And on p. 13 there is a r eference to 
the Mexican-Americans being "effectively denied access to the political 
proeesses" 'due in part to the "deficient educational system" • 
..tih <~~l .. - ;j 
This may be read as being contrary, at least implicitly, to the 
Court's opinion in Rodriguez. There (pp. 32, 33), we said that the 
educational system provided children with the opportunity to acquire th• 
basic minimal skills necessary to participate in the political process. 
In Rodri~ezJ of cours"e, we were speaking explicitly about present levels 
of educational expenditure, and we had previously emphasized the progress. "' "'. 
;f· !<> r/. , ~ . ">~ 
made in recent year I take it that in Regester you were talking about t 
',.(. --·-- il;f'., the history of disadvan aged educational backgrounds. The persons 
currentlydisadvantaged may '\\!:~.11 have found the 'sch.ools which they 
attended s ome years ago to be ' far less adequate than those now available. 
"\!, £. 
The progress in Texas has been most marked in the ~ad~. More-
over, I suppose a significant number of the persons were born 
and educated in Mexico or even in rural migratory labor camps in south 
Texas. 
In view of this apparent incompatibility in the two opinions as to 
educaticm in the same area of San Antonio, would you be willing to make 
the necessary modest revisions to emphasize that you are talking about 
the district court's finding of a history of disadvantaged treatment which 
- 2-
is unrelated to the education presently received by young residents. I 
note that on page 13 you refer to ''the residual impact of this history". 
2. The first sentence at the top of page 11 might be read, I think, 
as implying that requirement of a majority vote is in itself a potentially 
discriminatory election provision. I would suppose that, in most 
situations, the majority vote requirement is wholesome. This is 
especially true where there are a number of candidates for an office, 
none of whom obtains more than a fractional plurality. Perhaps you 
could drop a footnote along the lines of the enclosed draft. 
As these are minor suggestions, I am not sending a copy of this 
letter to the Conference. 
Sincerely, 
To: The Chi.Gf J usti ce 
Mr . J"-f:.>tlCG Dou&la ::> 
l!r . j "l1. 8 ~ ·._ G-.) Br·ei.man 
E.·. 3 c.~-i ;_--..:. c ~ 8 Lei;,n· t 
j.".L·· Ju~, t; ico Jtl,,r·:hal l 
LJ:. t.fL.J~J t- CG ;_; ~acl:mun 
J.u .. ~;l.~tlce J.)u"v~Gll/ 
' ;; L ~-;~ice llehm1ulst . .•. 
2nd DRAFT From: White , J. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAJi~1a ted : 
No. 72-147 Recirculated: aLd'- z i 
I 
Bob Bullock et al., Appellants,) On ~ ppeal fron~ t~e 
Umted States D1stnct 
v. Court for the Western 
Diana Regester et al. District of Texas. 
[May -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case raises two questions concerning the validity 
of the reapportionment plan for the Texas House of Rep-
resentatives adopted in 1970 by the State Legislative Re-
districting Board: First, whether there were unconstitu-
tionally large variations in population among the districts 
defined by the plan; second, whether the multimember 
districts provided for Bexar and Dallas Counties were 
properly found to have been invidiously discriminatory 
against cognizable racial or ethnic groups in those 
counties. 
The Texas Constitution requires the state legislature 
to reapportion the House and Senate at its first regular 
session following the decennial census. Tex. Const., 
Art. III, § 28.' In 1970, the legislature proceeded to 
1 Article III, § 28, of the Texas Constitution provides: 
"The Legislaturr shall, tit its fir~t regular session after the publi-
cation of each United State~ decennial census, apportion to the state 
into senatorial and representative districts, agreenble to the provisions 
of Sections 25. 26. and 26-n of this Article. In the event the Legis-
lature shall at an~· such fir~t regular se~sion following the publication 
of a. United Statrs decennial censu~ , fail to make such apportionment, 
snme shall be done b~- the Legislature Redistricting Board of Texas, 
which is hereby cre:lted, and shall be composed of five (5) members, 
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reapportion the House of RepreEentatives but failed to 
agree on a redistricting plan for the Senate. Litigatioll 
was immediately commenced ill state court challenging 
the constitutionality of the House reapportionment 
The Texas Supreme Court held that the legislature's 
plan for the House violated the Texas Constitutio11." 
as follow~;: The Lieutenant Governor, the Speakrr of the Housr of 
Representatives, the Attorney General, the Comptroller of Public 
Account::; and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, a maJor-
ity of whom shall constitute a quorum. Said Board shall assemble in 
the City of Austin within ninety (90) days after thr final adjournme11t 
of :ouch regular session. The Board shall, within si:-..iy (60) day~ 
after assembling, apportion the state into senatonal and reprrsenta-
tive districts, or into ::;enatorial or representative distncts, as thP 
failure of action of such Legislature may make nccc~sar~·. Such 
apportionment ~;hall be in writing and signed by three (3) or morf' 
of the member~ of the Board duly acknowledged as the act and deed 
of such Board, and, when so rxecuted and filed with the Secretary 
of State, shall have force and effect of law. Such apportionment shall 
become effective at the next succeeding ::;tatew1de general electJOIJ. 
The Supreme Court of Texas shall have jurisdiction to comprl such 
Commission ot perform it~; duties in accordancr w1th the proviswno; 
of this section by writ of mandamus or other extraordinary wnts 
conformable to the usages of law. The Legislature shall provide 
necessary funds for clrrical and technical aid and for other expenses 
incidental to the work of the Board, and the Lieutenant Governor 
and the Speaker of the House of Repre~:;entatives shall be entitled to 
receive per diem and travel exprnse dnrmg the Board's session in 
the same manner and amount as thry would receivr while attrndmg 
a special session of thr Legislature. This amrndment shall brcome 
effective January 1, 1951. A~ amrnclrd Nov. '2, 1948." 
2 The Court held that the plan violated Art. III, § 26, of the Texas 
Constitution, which provides: 
''The member::; of the Housr of Representative~; shalt br appor-
tioned among the several counties, according to the number of popu-
lation in each, as nearly as may be, on a ratio obtamed by div1ding 
the population of the State, as ascertainrd by the most recent United 
States census, by the number of members of which thP Hou~e i::; 
composed; provided, that whenever a single county ha:s sufficient 
populat10n to br PntJtled to '' Representative, such county shall be 
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Smith v. Craddick, 471 S. W. 2d 375 (Tex. 19-71). Mean-
while. pursuant to the requirements of the Texas Con-
stitution, a Legislative Redistricting Board had been 
formed to begin the task of redistricting the Texas Senate. 
Although the Board initially confined its work to the 
reapportionment of the Senate, it was eventually ordered, 
in light of the judicial invalidation of the House plan, 
to also reapportion the House. Mauzy v. Legislative 
Redistricting Board, 471 S. W. 2d 570 (Tex. 1971). 
On October 15, 1971, the Redistricting Board's plan for 
the reapportionment of the Senate was released, and, on 
October 22, 1971, the House plan was promulgated. 
Only the House plan remains at issue in this case. That 
plan divided the 150-member body among 79 single-
member and 11 multimember districts. Four lawsuits, 
eventually consolidated. were filed challenging the 
Board's Senate and House plans and asserting with re• 
spect to the House plan that it contained impermissiblf' 
deviations from population equality and that its multi-
member districts for Bexar County and Dallas County 
operated to dilute the voting strength of racial and ethnic 
minorities. 
A three-judge District Court sustained the Senate 
plan, but found the House plan unconstitutional. 
Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704 (WD Tex. 1972). 
The House plan was held to contain constitutionally 
impermissible deviations from population equality, and 
the multimember districts in Bexar and Dallas Counties 
formed into a ~eparate Representative District, and when two 01 
more countie::; are reqUTred to make up the ratw of repre::;entat ion, 
such counties shall be contiguous to rach other; and when any on<· 
county has more than ::;ufficient population to be enti1lrd to one· or 
more Repre::;cntat1ves, ::;uch Represrntative or Repre~;entatives :;hall 
be apportioned to such county. and for any ~urplus of population it 
may be joined in a Represrntativr DiHtrict with any other contiguous 
county or counties." 
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were deemed constitutionally invalid. The District 
Court gave the Texas Legislature until July 1, 1973, to 
reapportion the House, but the District Court permitted 
the Board's plan to be used for purposes of the 1972 
election, except for requiring that the Dallas County 
and Bexar County multimember districts be reconstituted 
into single-member districts for the 1972 election. 
The State appealed the statewide invalidation of the 
House plan and the substitution of single-member for 
multimember districts in Dallas County and Bexar 
County.H MR. JusTICE PowELL denied a stay of the 
judgment of the District Court, 405 U. S. 1201, and we 
noted probable jurisdiction. 409 V. S. 840. 
I 
We deal at the outset with the challenge to our juris-
diction over this appeal under 28 U. S. C. ~ 1253, which 
permits injunctions in suits required to be heard and 
determined by a three-judge district court to be ap-
pealed directly to this Court.4 It is first suggested that 
the case was not one required to be heard by a three-
judge court. The contention is frivolous. A statewide 
reapportionment statute was challenged and injunctions 
were asked against its enforcement. The constitutional 
questions raised were not insubstantial on their face , and 
the complaint clearly called for the convening of a three-
judge court. That the court declared the entire appor-
3 In a separate appeal, we summarily affirmrd that portion of the 
JUdgment of the District Court upholding; the Senate plan . Archer 
v. Smith, 409 U. S. 808 (1972) . 
1 28 U. S. C. § 1253 provides : 
''Except a~ othrrw1se providrd by law, any party may appeal to 
the Supreme Court from un order granting or denying, after notic0 
and hraring, an interlocutor~· or permanent injunction in any civ1! 
action, ::mit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be 
heard and determmed by a district court of thrre judgeo;.'' 
' . 
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tionment plan invalid, but entered an injunction only 
with respect to its implementation for the 1972 elections 
in Dallas and Bexar Counties, in no way indicates that 
the case required only a single judge. The State is there-
fore properly here on direct appeal with respect to the 
injunction dealing with Bexar and Dallas Counties, for 
the order of the court directed at those counties was 
literally an order "granting ... an ... injunction in 
any civil action . . . required ... to be heard and de-
termined by a district court of three judges" within the 
meaning of § 1253. 
We also hold that the State, because it appealed from 
the entry of an injunction, is entitled to review of the 
District Court's accompanying declaration that the pro-
posed plan for the Texas House of Representatives, m-
cluding those portions providing for multimember dis-
tricts in Dallas and Bexar Counties, was invalid state-
wide. This declaration was the predicate for the court's 
order requiring Dallas and Bexar to be reapportioned into 
single districts, for its order that ''unless the Legislature 
of the State of Texas on or before July 1, 1973, has 
adopted a plan to reapportion the legislative districts 
within the State in accordance with the constitutional 
guidelines set out in this opinion this court will so appor-
tion the State of Texas"; and for ordering the Secretary 
of State to "adopt aud implement any and all procedures 
necessary to properly effectuate the orders of this Court 
in conformance with this Opinion ... . " In these cir-
cumstances, although the State could not have directly 
appealed to this Court the entry of a declaratory Judg-
ment unaccompanied by any injunctive relief, Gunn v. 
University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 ( 1970); Mitchell 
v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970). we conclude that we 
have jurisdiction of the State's entire appeal. Roe v. 
Wade, - U. S. - (1973); Florida Lime & Avocado 
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Texas reapportionment plan before it, it was in the inter~ 
est of judicial economy and the avoidance of piecemeal 
litigatio·n that the three-judge District Court have juris-
diction over all claims raised against the statute when a 
substantial constitu tiona] claim was alleged , and an ap-
peal to us, once properly here, has the same reach . Roe 
v. Wade, supra , at-; Carter v. Jury Cornrn'n, 396 U.S. 
320 (1970); Florida Lirne & Avocado Growers v. Jacob-
son, supra, at 80. 
II 
The reapportionment plan for the Texas House of 
Representatives provides for 150 representatives to be 
selected from 79 single-member and 11 multimember 
districts. The ideal district is 74,645 persons. The dis-
tricts range from 71,597 to 78,943 in population per rep-
resentative, or from 5.8% overrepresentation to 4.1 % 
underrepresentation. The total variation between larg-
est and smallest district is thus 9.9 % ." 
The District Court read our prior cases to require any 
deviations from equal population among districts to be 
justified by "acceptable reasons" grounded 111 state 
policy; relied on Kirk patrick v. Preisler, 394 U. S. 526 
(1969), to conclude that the permissible tolerances sug-
gested by R eynoLds v. Sirns , 377 U. S. 533 ( 1964), had 
been substantially eroded; suggested that Abate v. 
Mundt, 403 U. S. 182 (1971), in accepting total devia-
tions of 11.9 % in a county reapportionment was sui 
generis; and considered the "critical issue" before it to 
be whether "the State [has] justified any and all vari-
ances, however small, on a basis of a consistent, rational 
State policy." 343 F. Supp., at 713. Noting the single 
fact that the total deviation from the ideal between Dis-
trict 3 and District 85 was 9.9 % , the District Court. 
5 See Appendix to opinion of the Court , 
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concluded that justification by the State was called for 
and could discover no acceptable state policy to support 
the deviations. The District Court was also critical of 
the actions and procedures of the Legislative Reappor-
tionment Board and doubted "that [ theJ board did th(i 
sort of deliberative job ... worthy of judicial abstinence.'' 
Id., at 717. It also considered the combination of single-
member and multimember districts in the House plan 
"haphazard," particularly in providing single-member 
districts in Houston and multimember districts in other 
metropolitan areas. and that this "irrationality, without 
reasoned justification, may be a separate ground for de-
claring the entire plan unconstitutional." I; Finally, the 
court specifically invalidated the use of multimember 
districts in Dallas and Bexar Counties as unconstitu-
tionally discri~inatory against a racial or ethnic g'Toup, 
The District Court's ultimate conclusion was that "the 
apportionment plan for the State of Texas is unconstitu-
tional as unjustifiably remote from the ideal of 'one man, 
one vote' and that the multi-member districting schemes 
for the House of Representatives as they relate specifically 
6 1! may be, although we arr not ::;uri?, that tlw D1stnct Court 
would have invalidated thP p!Hn ;;tat~:>widP becau::;e of what it thought 
was a11 irrational mixturp of mnlti- and single-member di;;trict~ . 
Thu~ in questioning the u~e of ::;ingle-membrr district~ 111 Hou;;ton 
but multimember di::;trict;; in all other urban area::;, and remnrkmg 
that the Statp had prov1ded nPither "compelling" nor "rational' ' 
explanation for the differing trratmrnt. the Di::;trict Court merely 
concluded that this tla:::sJfication ··may be" an mdeprndPnt ground 
for mvalidnting the plan. But therE' are not authorities in th1s 
Court for the proposition that thr merE' m1xturp of mult1- nnd ::;mgle-
member di::;trict::; in a single plan, even among urban area::;, i::: m-
vidiously discriminatory, and wr con::;trur the remark;; not a~ part 
of the Di:stnct Court'~ dPclnrator~· judgment mvalidatiug the ::;tatP 
plan but as mere advancE' advicr to tlw TPxas LegislaturE' ws to what 
would or would not be acceptable to thr District Coi'Lrt .. 
' . 
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to Dallas and to Bexar Counties are unconstitutiOnal in 
that they dilute the votes of racial minorities." ld., at 
735.7 
Insofar as the District Court's judgment rested 011 the 
conclusion that the population differential of 9.9o/(; from 
the ideal district between District 3 and District 85 
made out a prima facie equal protection violation under 
the• Fourteenth Amendment, absent special justification, 
the court was in error. It is plain from Mahan. v. 
Howell, 410 U.S.- (1970), and Gaffney v. Cummings, 
ante, p. -, that state reapportionment statutes are not 
subject to the same strict standards applicable to reap-
portionment of congressional seats. Kirkpatrick v. 
Preisler did not dilute the tolerances contemplated by 
Reynolds v. Sims with respect to state districting. and 
we did not hold in Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440 
(1967), or Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967), nor 
later in Mahan v. Howell, supra, that any deviations 
from absolute equality, however small, must be Justified 
to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid invalidation 
under the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set 
out in Gaffney v. Cummings, ante, p. -. we do not 
consider relatively minor population deviations among 
state legislative districts to substantially dilute the 
weight of individual votes in the larger districts so as to 
deprive individuals in these districts of fair and effective 
representation. Those reasons are as applicable to Texas 
as they are to Connecticut; and we cannot glean an 
equal protection violation from the single fact that two 
legislative districts in Texas differ from one another by 
7 The Di~trict Court al~o concluded, contrary to the a;:;;:;crtions of 
certain plaint iff·, that the Senate di:>trict ing ;:;cheme for Bexar County 
did not ''uncon~titutionally dilute the votes of any political faction 
or party.'' The majonty of the District Court also concluded thnt 
Senate districting ~cheme for Hnrns County did not dilute black 
voteb. 
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as much as 9.9% , when compared to the ideal district. 
Very likely, larger differences between districts would 
not be tolerable without justification "based on legitimate 
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational 
state policy," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S., at 579; Mahan 
v. Howell, supra, at -, but here we are confident that 
appellees failed to carry their burden of proof insofar 
as they sought to establish a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause from population variations alone. The 
total variation between two districts was 9.9%. but the 
average deviation of all House districts from the ideal 
was 1.82 7{ . Only 23 districts. all single-member, 
were over or underrepresented by more than 3%. 
and only three of those districts by more than 5o/<. 
We are unable to conclude from these deviations aloue 
that appellees satisfied the threshold requirement of prov-
ing a prima faci e case of invidious discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Because the District Court 
had a contrary vle\o\', its judgment must be reversed 111 
this respect.o 
III 
We affirm the District Court's judgment, however , 
insofar as it invalidated the multimember districts in Dal-
8 The Comt '~ conclu ~ion tha t the variation::; in thi ;; case were not 
ju~ tifiPd by a rationa l state polir ~· would, in any rvent , rPquirP re-
consideration and rever~al uuder Mahan \'. Howell, 410 U. S. -
(1973) . The Trxa~ Con~titution , Art . Ill. § 26, <·xpresse" tlw sta te 
policy agmn::; t cutting count~· hoes wherPvf r pos~ibl e in forming 
repre~entative distri ct::;. The District Court recognized thP polie~ · 
bur. without the benefit of Mahan\' . Elotcell . may havP thought thr 
va riations too great to be justified by that pulley. It pcrhap~ 
thought al ::;o that the policy had not been suJli cit>nt I~· or cons i~ tenll)· 
followed here. But it appea r;: to us that to ,; t a~ · within tolerable 
population limits it was necei:isa ry to cut some count~ · lines and tha t 
tlw Sta te achieved a con:::tirutiona lly acceptable accommodat ion be-
tween population principle~ and it ~ policy again~t euttmg county 
lines 111 forming representative dist ricth. 
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las and Bexar Counties and ordered those districts to be 
redrawn into single-member districts. Plainly, under our 
cases, multimember districts are not per se unconstitu-
tional, nor are they necessarily unconstitutional when 
used in combination with single-member districts in other 
parts of the State. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 
(1971); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. - ( 1973); ser 
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1964); Fortson v. 
Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth 
General Assembly, 377 U. S. 713 (1964); Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964)." But we have entertained 
claims that multimember districts are being used invidi-
ously to cancel out or minimize the voting strength of 
racial groups. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra; Burns v. 
Richardson, supra; Fortson v. Dorsey , supra. To sustain 
such claims, it is not enough that the racial group al-
legedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats 
in proportion to its voting potential. The plaintiffs' bur-
den is to produce evidence to support findings that the 
political processes leading to nomination and election 
were not equally open to participation by the group iu 
question-that its members had less opportunity than 
did other residents in the district to participate in the 
political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra, at 149-150. 
With due regard for these standards, the District Court 
first referred to the history of official racial discrimination 
in Texas. which at times touched the right of Negroes 
to register and vote and to participate in the democratic 
'
1 See Whitcomb v. Chav1s, 40a 0. S. 1:24, 141-14g (1971), and 
the case:-; discus:::ed in n. :22 of tlwt opinion. including Kilga1'1t11 "· 
Hill, :38() U. S. 120 ( 1967), where w<> affirmed the District Coul't ·~ 
rejection of petitioner;; ' contention that the combination of single-
member, multimember. and floterial district s in a :::ingle reappor-




BULLOCK v. REGESTER 11 
proceEses. 343 F. Supp., at 725. It referred also to the 
Texas rule requiring a majority vote as a prerequisite to 
nomination in a primary election and to the Eo-called 
"place" rule limiting candidacy for legislative offiice from 
a multimember district to a specified "place" on the 
ticket, with the result being the election of representa-
tives from the Dallas multimember district reduced to 
a head-to-head contest for each position. These char- \ 
acteristics of the Texas electoral system, neither in 
themselves improper or invidious, enhanced the oppor-
tunity for racial discrimination, the District Court 
thought. 11' More fundamentally, it found that since 
Reconstruction days, there have been only two Negroes 
in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of 
Representatives and that these two were the only two 
Negroes ever slated by the Dallas Committee for Re-
sponsible Government (DCRG), a white-dominated or-
ganization that is in effective control of Democratic Party 
candidate-slating in Dallas County.11 That organization. 
the District Court found, did not need the support of 
the Negro community to win elections in the county, and 
it did not therefore exhibit good-faith concern for the 
political and other needs and aspirations of the Negro 
community. The court found that as recently as 1970 
the DCRG was relying upon "racial campaign tactics in 
white precincts to defeat candidates who had the over-
whelming support of the black community." Jd., at 
727. Based on the evidence before it, the District Court 
concluded that "the black community has been effectively 
10 Tht'rt' is no requirement that randidatP~ rt'~idt' in o;ubdistricts 
of the multimember district. Thus, all raudidatt's may bt' ~elt'cted 
from outside the Negro re ·idential area . 
11 The District Court found that ·' it is extremely difficult to secure 
either a reprrsentntive ;;eat in the Dalla;: County delegation or thr 
Democratic primary nomination without the pndorsement of thr 
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excluded from participation in the Democratic primary 
selection process," id., at 726, and was therefore generally 
not permitted to enter into the political process in a 
reliable and meaningful manner. These findings and 
conclusions are sufficient to sustain the District Court's 
judgment with respect to the Dallas multimember dis-
trict and, on this record, we have no reason to disturb 
them. 
IV 
The same is true of the order requiring disestablish-
ment of the multimember district in Bexar County. 
Consistently with Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U. S. 475 
(1954), the District Court considered the Mexican-
Americans in Bexar County to be an identifiable class for 
Fourteenth Amendment purposes and proceeded to in-
quire whether the impact of the multimember district 
on this group constituted invidious discrimination. Sur-
v~ying the historic and present condition of the Bexar 
County Mexican-American community, which is concen-
trated for the most part on the west side of the C'ity of 
~an Antonio. the court observed. based upon prior cases 
and the record before it, that the Bexar community, along 
with other Mexican-Americans in Texas,'" had long "suf-
fered from, and continues to suffer from, the results and 
effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the 
fields of education, employment, economics, health. poli-
tics, and others.'' 343 F. Supp., at 728. The bulk of 
the Mexican-American community in Bexar County oc-
cupied the Barrio, an area consisting of about 28 con-
tiguous census tract in the City of San Antonio. Over 
78% of Barrio residents were Mexican-Americans, making 
up 29o/r of the county's total population. The Barrio / 
is an area of poor housing; its residents have low income 
12 Mexican-Amrricans con~tituted approximatrly 20% of the pol?u-
la_tion o~ thr St<_!te of Trxa~. 
: 
72-i4i-OPINION 
BULLOCK v. REGESTElt 13 
and a high rate of unemployment. The typical Mexican- ~ 
American suffers a cultural and language barrier ''~ that 
makes his participation in community processes ex-
tremely difficult, particularly, the court thought, with 
respect to the political life of Bexar County. "A cul- , 
tural incompatability ... conjoined with the poll tax and 
the most restrictive voter registration procedures in thEJ 
nation have operated to effectively deny Mexican-
American access to the political processes in Texas even 
longer than the Blacks were formally denied access by 
the white primary." 343 F. Supp., at 731. The residual 
impact of this history reflected itself in the fact that 
Mexican-American voting registration remained very 
l)OOr in the county and that, although they now occupy 
a plurality in Bexar County, only five Mexican~ 
Americans since 1880 have served in the Texas Legislature 
from that county. Of these, only two were from the 
Barrio area.H The District Court also concluded from 
the evidence that the Bexar County legislative delegation 
in the House was insufficiently responsive to Mexican-
American interests. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Dis-
trict Court evolved its ultimate assessment of the multi-
member district, overlaid, as it was, on the cultural and 
economic realities of the Mexican-American community 
in Bexar County and its relationship with the rest of the 
county. Its judgment was that Bexar County Mexican-
Americans "are effectively removed from the political 
processes of Bexar [County] in violation of all of thf' 
13 The District Court found that "[t]he fact that [Mexican-
Americans] are rt>ared m a ;;ubculture in which a dialect of Spanish 
is the primary languagt> provides pt>rmanent impediment;; to their 
educational and vocational advancement and creates other traumatic 
problems." 343 F. Supp., at 730. 
14 Two other residents of the Barrio, a Negro and an Anglo-
Amencan, have also ;;ervrd in the Texa;; LegislaturP. 
: 
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Whitcomb standards, whatever their absolute numbers 
may total in that County." U., at 733. Single-member 
districts were thought required to remedy "the effects 
of past and present discriminations against Mexican-
Americans," id., and to bring the community into the 
full stream of political life of the county and State by 
encouraging their further registration, voting, and other 
political activities. 
The District Court apparently paid due heed to Whit-
comb v. Chavis, supra, did not hold that every racial or 
political group has a constitutional right to be represented 
in the state legislature, but did, from its own special 
vantage point, conclude that the multimember district, 
as designed and operated in Bexar County, invidiously 
excluded Mexican-Americans from effective participation 
in political life, specifically in the election of representa-
tives to the Texas House of Representatives. On the 
record before us, we are not inclined to overturu these 
findings, representing as they do a ble11d of history and 
an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of 
the Bexar County multimember district in the light of 
past and present reality, political and otherwise. 




APPENDIX 1:0 OPINION OF WHITE, J. 
The Redistricting Board's plah embodied the following di::;trirts : 
Percent 
Average DPviation 
Multi- (Under) Ov('r 
bistl'ict Population Member Over (Under) 
1 76 ,285 1,H40 2.2 
2 77.102 2,457 3.3 
8 78,948 4.29 5.8 
4 71,928 (2,717) (8 .~) 
5 75,014 :~69 .5 
6 76,051 1,406 1.9 
7 (3) 221,:314 73,771 ( 874) (1.2) 
8 74,803 ( 342) ( .5) 
9 76.,818 2,168 2.9 
10 72,410 (2,285) (3.0~ 
11 73.13fi (1,509) (2.0 
12 74,704 59 .l 
13 75 ,929 1,284 1.7 
14 76,597 1,952 2.6 
15 76,701 2,05(1 2.8 
16 74,218 ( 427) ( .6) 
17 72,941 (1,704) (2.3) 
18 77,159 2,514 :~.4-
19 (2) 150,209 75,104 459 .H 
20 75,592 947 1.3 
21 74,651 6 .0 
22 73,311 (1,3:~4) (l.k) 
23 75 ,777 1,132 1.5 
24 73,960 ( 679) ( .9) 
25 75,633 988 1.3 
26 (18) 1,327 ,321 73,740 ( 905) (1.2) 
27 77,788 3.143 4.2 
28 72.367 (2,278) (3.1) 
29 76,505 1.860 2.5 
30 77,008 2,36a 3.2 
31 75,025 380 .5 
32 (9) 675,499 75,055 410 .5 
33 73,071 (1 ,574) (2.1) 
34 711.071 1.426 1.9 
35 (2) 147,55:3 73.777 ( 868) (1.2) 
36 74,633 ( 12) ( .0) 
37 (4) 295,516 73,879 ( 7!16) (1.0) 
38 78,897 4 ,252 5.7 
a9 77.363 2,718 3.6 
40 71,597 (:3,04R) (4.1) 








Multi" ( Umler) Ovrr 
District Population Member Ovrr (UJldcr) 
42 74,706 (')i .1 
43 74.160 { 485) ( .6 J 
44 75 ,278 ();~;~ .s 
45 7K,OYO :l,-+45 4.fi 
46 (11) S2G ,G98 75 ,154 509 .7 
47 76,:319 l ,G74 2.2 
48 (3) 220,056 n ,a52 (1,29:3) (1.7) 
49 7fi,254 1,609 2.2 
50 74,26S ( :377) ( .5) 
51 75 ,800 1,155 1.5 
52 76,601 1.956 2.6 
53 74,499 ( 146) ( .2) 
54 77 ,505 2,860 a.s 
55 76,947 2,ao2 3.1 
56 74,070 ( 575) ( .il) 
57 77,211 2,566 3.4 
58 75,120 475 .6 
59 (2) 144.995 72,497 (2,148) (2 .9) 
60 75,054 409 .5 
61 73,356 (1 ,289) ( 1.7) 
62 7~ ,240 (2,405) (3 .2) 
63 75,191 54(i .7 
64 74.546 ( 99) ( .1) 
65 75,720 1,075 1.4 
66 72.310 (2 ,:335) (3.1) 
67 75,034 :389 .5 
68 74,524 ( 121) ( .2) 
69 74,765 120 .2 
70 77,827 :~ . 1 82 4.3 
71 73,711 ( 934) (U) 
72 (4) 297 ,770 74.442 ( 203) ( .:~) 
73 74,309 ( 836) ( .5) 
74 73 ,743 ( 902) (1.2) 
7f> (2) 147 ,722 7;3 ,861 ( 784) (1.1) 
76 76 ,083 1,438 1.9 
77 77,704 :3.059 4.1 
78 71,900 (2 ,745) (3 .7) 
79 75 ,164 519 .7 
80 75 ,lll 4li6 .li 
81 75 ,674 1.029 1.4 
82 76,006 1,361 1.8 
83 75,752 ] ,107 1.5 
84 75,6:34 9H9 u 
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